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NO ENTRY TO THE PUBLIC LANDS: 
TOWARDS A THEORY OF A PUBLIC TRUST 
SERVITUDE FOR A WAY OVER ABUTTING 
PRIVATE LAND
Shelby D. Green*
Property confers and rests upon power.1
i. intRoduction
 When Congress established Yellowstone National Park in 1872, the policy 
animating national land use underwent a dramatic shift. The Yellowstone Act 
directed the Secretary of the Interior to adopt rules and regulations to “provide 
for the preservation, from injury or spoliation, of all timber, mineral deposits, 
natural curiosities, or wonders within said park, and their retention in their natural 
condition.”2 Protection and preservation thus became the guiding principles. This 
was not, however, the government’s original conception of the public lands. In 
fact, during the first hundred years of our nation, the policy had been one of 
disposal. And, if there is any truth to the quote above, then the United States 
government is all powerful, inasmuch as it owns more than a third of all land 
in the country.3 Most of the government-owned lands are classified as “public 
 * Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law, J.D. Georgetown University Law 
Center, B.S., Towson State College.
 1 See Gregory S. Alexander, Time and Property in the American Republican Legal Culture, 66 
n.y.u. L. Rev. 273, 277 (1991).
 2 Yellowstone Act of 1872, ch. 24, 17 Stat. 32, § 2 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 22 (2012)) 
(emphasis added).
 3 BuReau oF Land mgmt., u.S. dep’t oF the inteRioR, puBLic Land StatiSticS 10 (1977); 
u.S. puB. Land L. Rev. comm’n, one thiRd oF the nation’S Land 19 (1970). The  Bureau of 
Land Management (BLM) is an agency within the United States Department of the Interior, charged 
with administering America’s public lands. See 43 U.S.C. § 1731 (2012). The federal government 
owns approximately 761 million acres of land, of which almost 725 million acres are commonly 
domain,” that is, open to settlement, public sale, or other disposition under the 
federal public land laws, and which are not exclusively dedicated to any specific 
governmental or public purpose. Other lands are “reserved,” that is, set aside 
for some specific public purpose, such as wilderness areas or national parks, and 
exempt from the public land laws.
 What does it mean that the government owns the public lands? “Ownership,” 
in the sense of having an indisputable right of access and to enjoy for all manner 
of purposes, is a fluid concept. While most public land is theoretically open to the 
public for recreation, mining, and living—in the case of homesteads established in 
the nineteenth century, access to them by the public is not always assured. Despite 
what the term “public” in “public lands” suggests it has not been interpreted 
as vesting ownership rights or an unfettered right to access in the public. The 
government has often placed restrictions on access to public lands for various 
reasons, including conservation and protection of habitats. In recent decades, 
private abutting landowners have put up fences, technically on their own land, 
but with the decided purpose of controlling access to the national land—some 
even charging fees for access.4 
 These private landowners not only restrict public access, but have left the 
regulating agencies with inadequate access. The General Accounting Office has 
defined “inadequate access” to mean that the federal government does not have the 
“permanent, legal right for the public to enter federal land at the point(s) needed 
to use the land as intended by the managing agency.”5 In 1982, the Bureau of 
Land Management estimated that it (and the public) had access to only forty-two 
thought of as public lands. BuReau oF Land mgmt., u.S. dep’t oF the inteRioR, puBLic Land 
StatiSticS 10 (1977). Approximately 470 million acres are under the jurisdiction of the BLM, 
an agency within the Department of the Interior; approximately 192 million acres are national 
forests under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture; the Fish and Wildlife Service has 
jurisdiction over approximately 85 million acres; the National Park Service manages approximately 
72 million acres; the Department of the Army manages approximately ten million acres; and the 
Army Corps of Engineers manages approximately eight million acres. Id. These “public” lands 
include those acquired by treaty from other nations, including Indian Tribal lands, and lands ceded 
to the federal government by the thirteen original colonies. See Marla Mansfield, Symposium: A New 
Era for the Western Public Lands: When “Private” Rights Meet “Public” Rights: The Problems of Labeling 
and Regulatory Takings, 65 U. coLo. L. Rev. 193, 195 (1994).
 4 See Jim Robbins, Rich Newcomers Closing the Wilds of Montana, n.y. timeS, Monday, April 
26, 1999 at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/26/us/rich-newcomers-closing-
the-wilds-of-montana.html.
 5 u.S. gen. accounting oFFice, Rced-92-116BR, FedeRaL LandS: ReaSonS FoR and 
eFFectS oF inadequate puBLic acceSS 1 (April 14, 1992). 
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percent, or 198 million of the 470 million acres, of public lands it managed.6 The 
remaining 270 million acres were, or could be, blocked to public access by virtue 
of adjacent private land. In 1986 the amount of the inaccessible areas was given a 
new estimate—twenty-five million acres.7 However, that number was revised up 
in 1993, after directed programs, including purchase of easements and fee simple 
interests, and condemnation, to thirty-two million acres of BLM land.8 At the 
same time, 17.3 million acres, or approximately nine percent of the 191 million 
acres managed by the National Forest Service, did not have adequate access.9 In 
2008, nearly twenty million acres of BLM land had inadequate access.10
 Achieving access for the agencies, as well as for the public, seems a Herculean 
task. In 1993, the National Forest Service determined that to provide adequate 
access to these lands, approximately 28,000 easements, involving an estimated 
7,500 miles of rights of way, were needed.11 Despite the BLM’s successful 
efforts to acquire legal access to about 4.5 million acres of federal land, it would 
still need to acquire an estimated 13,000 easements to eliminate the backlog of 
access problems.12 
 Current federal management policies necessitate consistent public access to 
public lands, particularly as in recent decades, management of public lands has 
shifted away from exploiting the extractive value, through mining and timber, 
and towards increasing use for recreational activities, such as hiking, biking, 
camping, hunting, fishing, and photography. Recreational usage requires largely 
 6 Statement of Calvin Ragsdale, Access to Public and Private Lands before: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Public Lands, Reserved Water and Res. Conservation of the S. Comm. on Energy and 
Natural Res., 99th Cong. 49, 53 (March 15, 1986); see also Adela Backiel , Access to Public and Private 
Lands before: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands, Reserved Water and Res. Conservation of 
the S. Comm. on Energy and Natural Res., 99th Cong. 184–185, 198, 205 (March 15, 1986).
 7 Id.
 8 Public Lands and National Forests Lookout: Obstacles to Adequate Public Access, Oversight 
Hearing before the Subcomm. on National Parks, Forests & Public Lands, of the H. Comm. on Natural 
Res., 103d Cong. (1993) (testimony of Michael J. Penfold, Assistant Director, Land and Renewable 
Resources, Bureau of Land Management) [hereinafter Penfold]. See also u.S. gen. accounting 
oFFice, Rced-92-116BR, FedeRaL LandS: ReaSonS FoR and eFFectS oF inadequate puBLic 
acceSS 1 (April 14, 1992) (estimating 50.4 million acres with inadequate access).
 9 Obstacles to Adequate Public Access: Hearings before the House Subcommittee on National Parks, 
Forest and Public Lands, of the H. Comm. on Natural Res., 103d Cong. (1993) (testimony of James 
Overbay, Deputy Chief, Forest Service); see also u.S. gen. accounting oFFice, T-RCED-94-72, 
FedeRaL LandS: puBLic Land acceSS, (November 9, 1993).
 10 u.S. dept oF the inteRioR BuReau oF Land mgmt., Instruction Memorandum No. 
2008-092 (Mar. 28, 2008).
 11 Id. 
 12 Id.
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unimpeded public access,13 as “[i]nadequate access reduces opportunities for the 
public to use what it owns. It may [also] hinder proper management of public 
land by the BLM under multiple use principles.”14
 This article explores the problem of inadequate access and why owners of 
private property abutting public lands cannot fence out the public if their sole or 
primary purpose is to deny access to public land. The reasons why such landowners 
should not be allowed to put up fences, even on their own land, if the effect is to 
hinder the public’s access to public land are several. First, it is opportunistic and 
unjustly interferes with citizens’ ability to enjoy the interest they hold in public 
lands. Second, it denies citizens access rights rooted in the common law. Third, 
and perhaps most compelling, because of general notions of property ownership 
and the evolving public trust doctrine, the right to exclude the public to the 
extent of access to public lands never inhered in the adjoining private land title.
 This article begins with a general discussion of what it means to own land 
privately in our property regime. The second section discusses the United States’ 
landholdings in the country, the differences in ownership rights from that of private 
ownership, and the obligations imposed upon the federal government as sovereign 
and as proprietor of public lands. After that discussion, the article examines 
the historical causes for the lack of access, along with the federal government’s 
responses. This leads into a discussion of some of the legal theories available 
for assuring access. Finally, the argument presented is that, notwithstanding 
the Supreme Court’s attempt to close the door to implied easements in favor 
of the government,15 the expanded concept of public trust may still provide a 
path through.
 13 Penfold, supra note 8. After peaking some years ago, recreational visitation to the national 
parks has, at the very best, plateaued. Visitation Trends in National Parks: Hearing before the Subcomm. 
on National Parks, Recreation and Public Lands of the H. Res. Comm., 109th Cong. (2006) (testimony 
by John Schoppmann, Executive Vice President, Forever Resorts). Although the visitation from year 
to year varies, the trend in recreational visits is generally declining. Id. This decline comes despite 
an increase in park units and an ever-increasing National Park Service budget. Id. The decline in 
park usages has been attributed to the effects of drought conditions reducing the ability to engage 
in watercraft activities, high gasoline prices making travel more expensive, high access fees, a decline 
in the number of international visitors, changing lifestyles (people becoming more sedentary), and 
the existence of other recreational choices (casinos, water parks, etc.). Id. Moreover, some assert that 
the Park Service, through rulemaking or management policies, restricts access to thousands of park 
visitors who traditionally used the parks for recreational pursuits. Id. Take, for example, the Park 
Service’s attempt to limit or eliminate traditional motorized recreational pursuits. Id.
 14 Penfold, supra note 8.
 15 See Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668 (1979).
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ii. the pRopeRty conStRuct
 Blackstone described property as “that sole and despotic dominion which one 
man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion 
of the right of any other individual in the universe.”16 No doubt, property confers 
and rests upon power, since it bestows on owners a kind of sovereignty because the 
state stands behind the owners’ assertions of right.17 Morris Cohen long observed:
The recognition of private property as a form of sovereignty is 
not itself an argument against it [for] some form of government 
we must always have . . . . While, however, government is a 
necessity, not all forms of it are of equal value. At any rate it is 
necessary to apply to the law of property all those considerations 
of social ethics and enlightened public policy which ought to be 
brought to the discussion of any just form of government.18
 At the same time, property vests upon its owner a measure of autonomy, a 
private sphere beyond which the government may not intrude without permission. 
Of the rights said to inhere in property, i.e., to possess, use, enjoy fruits and profits, 
destroy, alienate, the right to exclude is often identified as the most important,19 
for it is this power that enables all the others. Possessory interests in property 
(fee simples, life estates) confer upon their owners the right to exclude. Non-
possessory interests (easements, real covenants) confer upon their beneficiaries the 
power to preclude possessory interest holders from excluding them. In either case, 
this right exists because of the state’s willingness to back up the landowner in his 
enjoyment. Thus, this means that upon an unauthorized entry of his property, the 
landowner can seek the aid of the state to enjoin the intrusion.20
 16 2 WiLLiam BLacKStone, commentaRieS *1. The eighteenth century Blackstonian concep-
tion of property as absolute rights in things has long since given way to the idea of property 
involving relations between persons with respect to things. See Antonio Gambaro, Property Rights 
in Comparative Perspective: Why Property is So Ancient and Durable, 26 tuL. euR. & civ. L.F. 205, 
225–26 (2011). In this latter conception, an owner is said to possess a bundle of rights: to possess, 
to use, to enjoy the fruits and profits of, to destroy, to alienate, and to exclude. See Margaret J. 
Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings 88 coLum. 
L. Rev. 1667, 1668 (1988). None of the sticks in the bundle can be said to be absolute, because 
the state may, for the larger societal interest, limit or otherwise regulate enjoyment of these rights. 
For example, a landowner may be forbidden from possessing property for which a certificate of 
occupancy has not been issued; to use a structure in a residential zone for industrial purposes, Village 
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 271 U.S. 365 (1926); to tear down a structure deemed a historical 
landmark, Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); or to exclude 
tenants based upon race, Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2012).
 17 Alexander, supra note 1, at 277.
 18 Morris Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 coRneLL L. q. 8, 14 (1927).
 19 Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (2000).
 20 See, e.g., Jacques v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997). 
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iii. the FedeRaL goveRnment aS pRopRietoR
 Determining the power to exclude in the context of federal lands requires 
first the determination of who holds ownership of the lands and the extent of 
any exclusive possessory interest in that ownership. Whatever interest owners of 
land abutting public lands hold must be derived from and limited by the interest 
held by the original transferor, the federal government. The Property Clause 
of the Constitution provides: “Congress shall have power to . . . make all 
needful Rules and Regulations respecting . . . Property belonging to the United 
States . . . .”21 What does this power insinuate about the government’s ownership 
of lands? According to Professor James Huffman, there are several possible 
understandings of the legal status of public lands in relation to the government 
and its citizens—the public lands are:
1. Within the government’s sovereign power
2. A commons available to all comers
3. Held by the government as a trustee for all as tenants  
 in common
4. Held by the government as trustee acting for the citizenry
5. Held by the government as a proprietor22 
 Professor Huffman asserts that only the first statement is true without 
question, explaining that the history of the western expansion of the United States 
has been described in terms of the gradual acquisition of lands previously owned 
by other European nations and by the various aboriginal populations.23 “It is 
a history of the extension of the sovereignty of the United States in the face of 
competing claims of sovereignty.”24 The government’s goal of expansion though, 
was twofold: (1) establish an organized system for settlement of the western lands 
and therefore limit random occupation by squatters, and (2) obtain a return to 
the treasury through sales of tracts to individuals.25 This exercise of sovereignty 
occurred notwithstanding purported guarantees to access in legislation, 
particularly the Organic Act of 1897,26 which states: “ . . . [n]or shall anything 
herein prohibit any person from entering upon such forest reservations for all 
proper and lawful purposes, including that of prospecting, locating and developing 
 21 u.S. conSt. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
 22 James L. Huffman, The Inevitability of Private Rights in Public Lands, 65 u. coLo. L. Rev. 
241, 255 (1994).
 23 Id. at 256.
 24 Id.
 25 Id. at 257. The other propositions can be dismissed largely because of the power of the 
government to control access and use of the public lands. Id. at 259. Huffman points out, though, 
that these laws were often not enforced such that unauthorized occupation historically was rampant. 
Id. at 259.
 26 Organic Act of 1897, ch. 2, 30 Stat. 34 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 473).
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the mineral resources thereof . . . .”27 This language may be interpreted not so 
much as guaranteeing access as ensuring the public lands are available for all uses. 
Additionally, as discussed below, the Supreme Court has recognized that Congress 
holds the public lands in trust for the people of the whole country, but cautioned 
that it is for Congress to determine how that trust is to be administered.28
iv. the FedeRaL goveRnment aS tRuStee
Congress retains the power and duty to regulate how the lands 
are to be used.29
Congress, recognizing that the enjoyment by future generations 
of the national parks can be ensured only if the superb quality 
of park resources and values is left unimpaired, has provided 
that when there is a conflict between conserving resources and 
values and providing for enjoyment of them, conservation is to 
be predominant.30 
 Congress’ power to direct particular uses of the public lands derives from the 
Property Clause of the Constitution, under which “Congress exercises the powers 
both of a proprietor and of legislature over the public domain.”31 The Supreme 
Court has consistently interpreted Congress’ power under the Property Clause to 
 27 Id.
 28 Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 536 (1911) (“[T]he government may deal with such 
lands precisely as a private individual may deal with his farming property.”) (quoting Camfield 
v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 524 (1897)). Camfield is discussed infra at notes 37–38 and 
accompanying text.
 29 Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976); Camfield, 167 U.S. at 524. This power 
is manifest from the language appearing in legislation. For example, in the National Park Service 
Organic Act of 1916, that created the National Park Service, Congress stated a goal to “conserve 
the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wildlife therein.” Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 
108-352, 118 Stat. 1395, (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2012)). In subsequent legislation, Congress 
reiterated these goals and priorities. In the General Authorities Act of 1970, Congress stated the 
obligation of the government as to national parks and sought to insure that the basis for decision-
making concerning the National Park System continued to be the criteria provided by the National 
Park Service Organic Act (providing that “Congress further reaffirms, declares, and directs that the 
promotion and regulation of the various areas of the National Park System, as defined in section 1(c) 
of this title, shall be consistent with and founded in the purpose established by section 1 of this title 
[. . . to the common benefit of all the people of the United States.”). 16 U.S.C. § 1a-1 (2012). (“The 
authorization of activities shall be construed and the protection, management, and administration 
of these areas shall be conducted in light of the high public value and integrity of the National Park 
System and shall not be exercised in derogation of the values and purposes for which these various 
areas have been established, except as may have been or shall be directly and specifically provided 
by Congress.”). 
 30 Robin W. Winks, The National Parks Service Act: “A Contradictory Mandate”?, 74 denv. u. 
L. Rev. 575, 613 (1997).
 31 Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 540. 
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be extremely expansive, repeatedly observing, that “[t]he power over the public 
land thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations.”32 Yet, these statements 
cannot be taken at face value since the Supreme Court and lower courts have 
recognized limitations, although narrow, on the way in which the government 
deals with public land. Judicial review of Congressional acts as to federal lands 
has been limited to determining whether there is a rational relationship between 
Congress’ stated ends and its chosen means.33 Thus, even though the Supreme 
Court has acknowledged the special status of public lands under the Property 
Clause, it has not been inclined to set limits on the way in which Congress 
manages public lands, at least under a broad common law standard. 
 The Court’s general reluctance to intrude into this area is made clear in Light 
v. United States.34 Light, a rancher, grazed his cattle on a National Forest without 
authorization and was charged with trespass. His argument that Congress could 
not constitutionally withdraw large areas of land from settlement without the 
consent of the state where the land was located was unsuccessful.35 The Court 
explained that the Government had the right to deal with federal lands as an 
ordinary individual; it may sell or withhold them from sale. Further: 
The courts cannot compel it to set aside lands for settlement, or 
to suffer them to be used for agricultural or grazing purposes, 
nor interfere when, in the exercise of its discretion, Congress 
establishes a forest reserve for what it decides to be national and 
public purposes . . . . These rights are incident to proprietorship, 
to say nothing of the power of the United States as a sovereign 
over the property belonging to it.36
 In Camfield v. United States, the Court, in very broad terms, laid out the 
nature of government ownership of public lands.37 The government possesses all 
the “rights of an ordinary proprietor, to maintain possession and to prosecute 
 32 Id. at 539; see also United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 28 (1940); Alabama v. 
Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 273 (1954); United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 27 (1987); Gibson v. 
Chouteau, 80 U.S. 92, 99 (1871); United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. 526, 538 (1840).
 33 Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“The only 
limitation on congressional authority [preemptively to regulate private activities under the 
Commerce Clause] is the requirement that the means selected be reasonably related to the goal of 
regulating interstate commerce.”) (citing Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 
U.S. 264, 291 (1981) (addressing legislative powers under the Commerce Clause)).
 34 220 U.S. 523 (1911).
 35 It is well-settled that one who, without right, enters public lands of the United States is a 
trespasser, see Jones v. United States, 195 F.2d 707, 709 (9th Cir. 1952), and that the United States, 
like any other private landholder, is entitled to protect its property against such trespassers. See 
Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 524 (1897); Utah Power and Light Co. v. United States, 
243 U.S. 389, 404 (1916); United States v. Gardner, 903 F. Supp. 1394, 1402 (D. Nev. 1995).
 36 Light, 220 U.S. at 537.
 37 167 U.S. 518 (1897).
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trespassers . . . [i]t may deal with such lands as a private individual may deal with 
his farming property; . . . [i]t may sell or withhold them from sale, . . . [i]t may 
open them to preemption or homestead settlement.”38 This general reluctance 
to scrutinize the land management decisions of the federal government may be, 
in large part, in deference to or a consequence of the political nature of these 
decisions. According to Professor Huffman, “the idea that the government can 
own lands in the same sense as any private owner is clearly a myth.”39 Primarily, 
the management decisions of the federal government are always political, whether 
it is acting in its sovereign or its proprietary capacities.40 Understanding the 
legal status of the public lands as the property of the United States requires a 
consideration of the factors, both pragmatic and political, that influence the 
decisions of the agencies charged with the management of these lands. 
 These cases clearly demonstrate the Supreme Court’s reluctance to second-
guess any management decision by Congress as to its proprietary property. They 
almost invariably involve challenges to an act of the federal government rather 
than the failure to act or the failure to satisfy the duties normally associated with 
trusteeship.41 Professor Huffman explains that it is also important to understand 
that “the government acting in its proprietary capacity is different from a private 
party acting in its proprietary capacity because the government possesses unique 
coercive powers,”42 powers which also exist when the government is acting in its 
sovereign capacity. Like any proprietor, the government has the legal authority 
to grant or preclude access to, and use of, the public lands. Moreover, “[s]ubject 
to the minimal limits of the Constitution, the government may exercise these 
powers so as to grant or deny benefits to or to permit or deny access to whomever 
 38 Id. at 524.
 39 Huffman, supra note 22, at 262. 
 40 The federal government can also influence land and resource markets in ways not available 
to private parties through subsidization of the use of publicly owned resources to the competitive 
disadvantage of private owners, the regulation of private land and resource markets to the advantage 
of public lands, and the withholding of public resources from the market to the advantage of private 
owners and to the disadvantage of consumers. Huffman, supra note 22, at 267–68.
 41 The latter challenges have been presented to the lower courts with mixed results. See, e.g., 
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (overturning BLM’s revocation 
of withdrawals under plans adopted prior to the Federal Land Policy Management Act (FLPMA) 
where the revocations did not satisfy new FLPMA criteria); Sierra Club v. Block, 622 F. Supp. 842 
(D. Colo. 1985) (refusing to require the Secretary to act to claim reserved water rights noting that 
while the government holds the land in trust, “it is not for the courts to say how that trust is to 
be administered.” Indeed, here Congress had set out statutory directives for the management and 
protection of the public lands, and those duties “comprise[d] all the responsibilities which defendants 
must faithfully discharge.”) (citing Sierra Club v. Andrus, 487 F. Supp. 443, 449 (D.D.C. 1980) 
(rejecting distinction between “trust” and “statutory” responsibilities in management of national 
parks system, holding “these highest principles of management found in the statute . . . also intended 
to serve as the basis for any judicial resolution of competing private and public values and interest 
in areas of the National Park System,” and concluding that the statute, 43 U.S.C. § 1701, 1782(c), 
embodies the entire duties and responsibilities of the Secretary in managing public lands).
 42 Huffman, supra note 22, at 269.
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it chooses.”43 Sometimes, the conferral or denial of benefits or access is intentional 
and based upon various policy objectives. In other ways, the result seems purely 
accidental or random.
v. ReaSonS FoR LacK oF acceSS: puBLic Land poLicieS oveR the yeaRS
 Until the last three decades, Congress seemed oblivious to the need to ensure 
that the wonders of the forests and wilderness areas are accessible to the public. 
Since the early days of the republic, Congress engaged in acts calculated, if not 
by design, by ignorance, to cut off the public from vast parts of the wild through 
aggressive land disposal policies. From 1812 to 1946 alone, the government 
disposed of more than a billion acres to private ownership, much of it sold at 
a pittance.44
 Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, Congress began land grants to 
railroads to aid in the establishment of a transcontinental railroad.45 The land 
 43 Id.
 44 The first public land policy was one of disposal, beginning with the Land Ordinance of 1785 
that established the rectangular land survey system and under which public land was sold to reward 
soldiers and sailors and to raise revenue. See Land Ordinance of 1785, ch. 32, 1 Stat. 563 (1785). By 
1805, hundreds of thousands of acres had been sold. In 1812, the General Land Office was established 
to superintend, execute, and perform such acts and things touching on public lands. Steven Martin, 
A Long Tradition of Federal Resource Protection, U.S. Dept. of Interior Bureau of Land Mgmt., 
http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/info/history/sidebars/law_enforcement/a_long_tradition_of.html 
(last visited Nov. 27, 2013). Tracts of eighty acres sold for $1.25 per acre. See Land Act of 1820, 
ch. 51, 3 Stat. 566. See generally George Cameron Coggins & Doris K. Nagel, “Nothing Beside 
Remains’: The Legal Legacy of James G. Watt’s Tenure as Secretary of the Interior on Federal Land Law 
and Policy, 17 B.c. envtL. aFF. L. Rev. 473, 480 n.24 (1990). Under the Armed Occupation Act 
of 1842, 160 acres were awarded to persons willing to fight Indians in Florida, if they occupied and 
cultivated the land for five years. See Armed Occupation Act of 1842, ch. 122, 5 Stat. 502 (1841). 
In the settlement of Oregon Country in the 1850’s, 320 acres were given to individuals, and 640 
to couples willing to settle in Oregon Country. See Carlos A. Schwantes, Pacific Northwest: An 
Interpretive History 103 (1989). The Timber & Stone Act of 1878 authorized the sale of nontillable 
public timberland for personal use for $2.50 per acre; 160 acre parcels if the purchaser planted forty 
acres into trees spaced no farther than twelve feet apart and kept them growing for ten years. See 
Timber and Stone Act of 1878, ch. 151, 20 Stat. 89 (1878) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 311 (2012)). 
The Free Timber Act of 1878 gave miners the right to cut timber on public domain mineral claims 
for mining and domestic purposes. See Free Timber Act, ch. 150, 20 Stat. 88 (1878) (codified at 16 
U.S.C. § 604 (2012)). The Desert Land Act of 1877 enabled settlers to buy 640 acres of desert land 
for $1.25 per acre if they constructed irrigation systems. See Desert Land Act of March 3, 1877, ch. 
107, 19 Stat. 377 (1877) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 321 (2012)).
 45 The land grants included: the 1862 Pacific Railroad Act, ch. 120, 12 Stat. 489 (1862), the 
1864 Northern Pacific Railroad Act, ch. 217, 13 Stat. 365 (1864), and the General Railway Act of 
1875, ch. 152, 18 Stat. 482 (1875). There is some confusion among the courts as to exactly what 
interest, whether a fee interest or merely a right of way, was conveyed to the railroads under this 
Act. See Home on the Range v. AT&T Corp., 386 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1014–15 (S.D. Ind. 2005) 
(despite instrument’s use of term “right of way” for grants to the railroads under the 1862 and 
1864 acts, railroads acquired title to the estate, subject to a right of reverter in the federal govern- 
ment; but grants under the 1875 act conveyed only a right of way, leaving title to the estate in the 
federal government).
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grants provided land for every mile of track laid. The land surrounding the 
railroad right of way was divided into “checkerboard” blocks, the odd-numbered 
blocks being granted to the railroads, the even-numbered reserved by Congress. 
It was the belief that these even-numbered blocks would be viewed of such value, 
as a consequence of railway access, that they could be sold for high sums, thereby 
making up for the grant to the railroads. However, Congress had difficulty selling 
the even-numbered tracks and ended up giving them away under the Homestead 
Act of 1862.46 Under the railroad and homestead acts, Congress sought to 
promote the settlement of the West. Up to 160 acres of federal land was given to 
individuals who agreed to live on the land and make improvements for five years.47 
Although the Homestead Act made no provision for access to and from granted 
land over the lands retained by the United States, the presumption was that “‘an 
implied license’ to use public lands would provide settlers with unimpeded access 
to their property.”48 However, courts have rejected the argument that the right of 
access accompanying the grant of an inholding was necessarily a property interest 
in the nature of an easement.49 Nevertheless, homesteaders’ implied access to cross 
federal lands remained largely unimpeded until the late nineteenth century when 
“efforts expanded to protect the nation’s natural resources from the results of what 
was perceived as overly generous land use policies.”50
 46 Pub. L. No. 37-64, (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 161–284 (repealed 1976)). Subsequent 
enactments increased the amount of acres which could constitute a homestead. See Desert Lands 
Act of 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (1877) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 321–339 (2012)) (allowing 
larger than 160 acres in dry western areas); Enlarged Homestead Act of 1909, ch. 160, 35 Stat. 639 
(repealed 1976) (allowing homesteads of 320 acres for dry farming).
 47 Pub. L. No. 37-64, (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 161–284 (repealed 1976)); see also Desert 
Lands Act of 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (1877) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 321–339 (2012)); 
Enlarged Homestead Act of 1909, ch. 160, 35 Stat. 639 (repealed 1976); Homestead Act of 1862, 
Pub. L. No. 37-64 (1862) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 161–284 (repealed 1976)). Under both the 
railroad and homestead grants, those who acquired land chose the best land available for their needs. 
Perry R. Hagenstein, The Federal Lands Today: Uses and Limits, in RethinKing the FedeRaL LandS 
74, 82 (Sterling Brubaker, ed., 1984). The land left in federal ownership was the land less suited for 
private use. Id. The current BLM lands are thus what were left over.
 48 United States v. Jenks, 22 F.3d 1513, 1515 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting Buford v. Houtz, 133 
U.S. 320, 326 (1890)).
 49 An inholding is private land located within and surrounded by federal lands. See United 
States v. Jenks, 129 F.3d 1348, 1354 (10th Cir. 1997); see also McFarland v. Kempthorne, 545 F.3d 
1106 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The Homestead Act did not grant settlers a vested property right of access 
over public lands to their homesteads, but instead merely sanctioned the longstanding customary 
use of public lands by a settler.”) (quoting Fitzgerald Living Trust v. United States, 460 F. 3d 1259, 
1265 (9th Cir. 2006)).
 50 Jenks, 22 F.3d at 1515, (quoting Rights-of-Way Across National Forests, 43 Op. Att’y Gen. 
No. 26243 (1980)).
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 Yet another law Congress enacted with good intentions, but which proved 
shortsighted in its consequences, was the Mining Law of 1872.51 Congress aimed 
to promote mineral exploration and development on federal lands in the western 
United States, offering the opportunity to obtain clear title to mines already 
worked, thereby settling the West.52 Under the terms of the law, any person could 
go onto public lands in search of valuable minerals and obtain a patent to the 
areas mined upon discovery of certain minerals.53 Prior to patent and during 
initial exploration of a prospective mining claim, the public retained the right of 
access across a claim to get to other public lands, so long as recreational usage did 
not materially interfere with exploration and development of the claim.54 After 
patenting the claim, the patent holder obtained the rights of any other private 
owner and could block entry by the public.55
 51 General Mining Act of 1872, ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91–96 (1872) (codified at 30 U.S.C. 
§§ 22–42). See also Shelby D. Green, Reclaiming the Public Domain by Repeal of the Mining Law of 
1872, 6 hoFStRa pRop. L. J. 85 (1993). 
 52 30 U.S.C. § 23 (2012). 
 53 30 U.S.C. § 22 (2012). The statute requires an annual maintenance work totaling $100, or 
an equivalent fee in its place. See 30 U.S.C. § 28b (2012); 30 U.S.C. § 28f (2012). Upon discovery, 
the prospector can obtain a patent to the area mined for as little as $2.50 per acre for placer claims 
and $5.00 per acre for lode claims. 30 U.S.C. § 37 (2012).
 54 See United States v. Curtis-Nevada Mines, Inc., 611 F.2d 1277, 1286 (9th Cir. 1980) 
(holding there was no evidence “that the public use of land included within their unpatented 
mining claim has ‘materially interfered’ with any mining activity. Absent such evidence, section 
612(b) applies in this case to afford the general public a right of free access to the land on which 
the mining claims have been located for recreational use of the surface resources and for access to 
adjoining property.”).
 55 30 U.S.C. § 26 (2012). Although an individual may still pursue exploration and 
development of mining claims on public lands, there has not been a patent issued since 1994 under 
the Mining Act of 1872. See G. Donald Massey, 142 i.B.L.a. 243, 245–46 (1998). Apart from 
access problems created by granting private property rights amid public lands, the activities involved 
in mining are threatening the natural environment where they occur in unique natural areas. See 
Mining Law Impact in Arizona: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Energy and Mineral Res. of the H. 
Comm. on Natural Res., 100th Cong. (2007) (testimony of Chuck Huckleberry, Cnty. Admin., 
Pima Cnty., Ariz.). The scarred landscapes and little or no chance of meaningful reclamation of 
public lands is the legacy of the 1872 Mining Law. Id. Mining impacts on air, water, and soil 
quality continue to cause public health concerns. Id. However, in recent years, the BLM has enacted 
fairly elaborate regulations aimed at minimizing these impacts. Under these regulations, miners 
are required to submit Mining Plans of Operations (“MPOs”) to the BLM before engaging in 
mining operations on claims if those operations are greater than a “casual use” that would disturb 
more than five acres of land. See 43 C.F.R. §§ 3809.11, 3809.21 (2012). Similarly, the BLM may 
have to perform the consultation and compliance required by the Endangered Species Act and/
or the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 43 C.F.R. § 3809.411(a)
(3)(iii) (2012); Native American tribes, 43 C.F.R. § 3809.411(a)(3)(iv) (2012); the federal Clean 
Water Act, 43 C.F.R. § 3809.411(a)(3)(ix) (2012); NEPA, 43 C.F.R. § 3809.411(a)(3)(ii) (2012) 
(requiring the preparation of an environmental impact statement before approving an MPO if 
the approval would constitute a “major Federal action [] significantly affecting the quality of the 
human environment”); 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012) (systematic evaluation of environmental 
impacts); and the Federal Land Policy Management Act (“FLPMA”) (requiring the Secretary of 
Interior to “take any action necessary to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the [public] 
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 Even as it seems that in the nineteenth century, the need for public access 
to public lands or rights-of-ways over private lands did not occur to Congress as 
it doled out these parcels for railroad construction, for private ownership, or for 
mineral exploration, later congressional acts and agency policies have continued 
to exacerbate the problem of access, including temporary closures,56 rules banning 
certain types of vehicles,57 and the imposition of user fees.58 All the while, the 
lands.” 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2012)). “Unnecessary or undue degradation” [UUD] is defined in the 
regulations to mean “conditions, activities, or practices” that fail to comply with the “performance 
standards in [43 C.F.R.] § 3809.420,” that fail to comply with “other Federal and state laws related 
to environmental protection and protection of cultural resources,” that are “not ‘reasonably incident’ 
to prospecting, mining, or processing operations” as defined in 43 C.F.R. § 3715.0–5, or that “[f ]ail 
to attain a stated level of protection or reclamation required by specific laws” in special status areas. 
43 C.F.R. § 3809.5 (2012). FLPMA and its implementing regulations require the Secretary to “take 
any action necessary” to prevent UUD. 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2012).
 56 FLPMA gives the BLM authority to temporarily close off federal lands: “in the management 
of lands to protect the public and assure proper resource utilization, conservation, and protection,” 
“public use and travel may be temporarily restricted.” 43 C.F.R. § 8364.1 (2012). Areas may be 
closed to protect health and safety, prevent excessive erosion, prevent unnecessary destruction 
of plant and wildlife habitat, protect the natural environment, preserve areas having cultural or 
historical value, protect scientific studies, or preserve scientific values. 43 U.S.C. § 8364.1 (2012); 
see also 43 C.F.R. § 8364.1 (2012). 
 57 Under FLPMA, the BLM has the authority to close off the public domain from certain 
types of vehicles, such as off road vehicles. 43 U.S.C. § 8342.1(2012); see Humboldt Cnty. v. 
United States, 684 F.2d 1276, 1283–84 (9th Cir. 1982) (upholding BLM assertion that it had the 
authority to temporarily close area it was considering designating as wilderness, although notice to 
public and hearing were required for designation of land as wilderness, and upholding BLM’s power 
to close areas to off-road vehicles, even when two-wheel drive vehicles allowed). There is a current 
controversy between various factions and within the federal government as to the use of national 
parks by all-terrain vehicles and snowmobiles. Motorized Recreation on Federal Land: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Forests and Forest Health, of the H. Res. Comm., 106th Cong. (2005) (testimony 
of Dan Heinz). The NPS has been exploring the issue of imposing limits on access for use by these 
vehicles, only to be met with great reaction by these users. Id.
 58 See 16 U.S.C. § 6801, 6802 (2012). The Federal Lands Recreation Enhancement Act of 
2004 authorized the Forest Service and BLM to impose fees for use of certain facilities and for entry 
into certain governmental lands. Id. However, the Act contains a number of provisions designed 
to protect free access. Id. There are prohibitions on charging Standard Amenity or Expanded 
Amenity fees,
(A) solely for parking, undesignated parking, or picnicking along roads or trailsides, 
(B) for general access . . . (C) for dispersed areas with low or no investment . . .  
(D) for persons who are driving through, walking through, boating through, horseback 
riding through, or hiking through Federal recreational lands and waters without using 
the facilities and services, (E) for camping at undeveloped sites that do not provide 
a minimum number of facilities and services . . . , (F) for use of overlooks or scenic 
pullouts, (G) for travel by private, noncommercial vehicle over any national parkway 
or any road or highway established as a part of the Federal-aid system.
Id.; 16 U.S.C. § 6802(d)(1) (2012). It also prohibits the Secretary of the Interior from charging an 
entrance fee for federal recreational lands and waters managed by the Bureau of Land Management, 
the Bureau of Reclamation, or the Forest Service. Id.; 16 U.S.C. § 6802(e)(2) (2012). The Act 
further provides that fee day-use “areas” must contain six minimum amenities: designated developed 
parking, a permanent toilet facility, a permanent trash receptacle, interpretive sign or kiosk, picnic 
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access issue had been left to the individual parties involved. Congress did not 
foresee what the maze of legislation on the public lands would portend or how 
they might complicate the fulfillment of the new policies of preservation and 
conservation that began with the creation of Yellowstone National Park.59 The 
Forest Reserve Act of 1891 followed, empowering the president to create “forest 
reserves: by withdrawing forest lands from the public domain.”60 In 1897, the 
Organic Administration Act directed that national forests be managed to improve 
and protect the forests or “for the purpose of securing favorable conditions 
of water flows, and to furnish a continuous supply of timber for the use and 
necessities of citizens of the United States.”61 While courts have largely deferred 
to the executive on the management and disposal of federal lands, Congress, 
through legislation had long imposed specific duties and limitations on its 
tables, and security services. 16 U.S.C. § 6801; 16 U.S.C. § 6802(f )(4)(D) (2012). There have 
recently been claims by groups that the imposition of certain user fees exceeded the statutory 
authority, that they were imposed merely for parking, or where users are merely passing through 
on a hike or bike ride, in areas called “high impact” areas (although not authorized in the statutes) 
or engaged in activities called special activities, under a new definition). Federal Lands Recreation 
Enhancement Act Oversight, Hearing on H.R. 3283 Before the S. Comm. on Pub. Lands and Forests 
of the S. Comm. on Energy and Natural Res.,109th Cong. (2005) (testimony of Kitty Benzar, 
Co-Founder, Western Slope No-Fee Coalition). 
 59 The Yellowstone Park Act had the approval of President Ulysses S. Grant, who signed it 
into law on March 1, 1872. The text of the Act follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of 
America in Congress assembled, That the tract of land in the Territories of Montana 
and Wyoming lying near the head-waters of the Yellowstone River, and described as 
follows, . . . is hereby reserved and withdrawn from settlement, occupancy, or sale 
under the laws of the United States, and dedicated and set apart as a public park 
or pleasuring-ground for the benefit and enjoyment of the people; and all persons 
who shall locate or settle upon or occupy the same, or any part thereof, except as 
hereinafter provided, shall be considered trespassers, and removed therefrom.
SEC. 2. That said public park shall be under the exclusive control of the Secretary 
of the Interior, whose duty it shall be, as soon as practicable, to make and publish 
such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary or proper for the care and 
management of the same. Such regulations shall provide for the preservation, from 
injury or spoliation, or all timber, mineral deposits, natural curiosities, or wonders 
within said park, and their retention in their natural condition. . . . He shall provide 
against the wanton destruction of the fish and game found within said park, and 
against their capture or destruction for the purposes of merchandise or profit. 
Yellowstone Act of 1872, ch. 24, 17 Stat. 32, § 2 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 22 (2012)).
 60 Forest Reserve Act 1891, ch. 561, § 24, 26 Stat. 1103 (1891) (codified at 16 U.S.C. 
§ 471 (repealed 1976)). See also Mont. Wilderness Ass’n v. United States, 496 F. Supp. 880, 888 (D. 
Mont. 1980), aff ’d on other grounds, 655 F. 2d 951 (9th Cir. 1981). President Cleveland issued a 
proclamation reserving approximately twenty million acres as forest lands. Proclamation No. 19, 29 
Stat. 893; (Feb. 22, 1897); Proclamation No. 25, 26, 29 Stat. 902. (Feb. 22, 1897).
 61 Organic Act of 1897, ch. 2, 30 Stat. 34 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 551 (2012)).
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agents charged with managing the federal lands.62 The courts have held the 
government to the promises of these acts, at first, broadly interpreting the 
Organic Act as making “resource protection the primary goal,” making “resource 
protection the overarching concern,” or as establishing a “primary mission of 
resource conservation,” a “conservation mandate,” “an overriding preservation 
mandate,” “an overarching goal of resource protection,” or “but a single purpose, 
namely, conservation.”63 
 Continuing this protection policy, Congress adopted a series of Acts 
throughout the early twentieth century. In 1903, lands were withdrawn from the 
public domain to create a system of wildlife preserves.64 In 1906, the National 
Monument and Antiquities Act was enacted empowering the president to proclaim 
national monuments on federal lands containing historic landmarks, historic 
and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest.65 
The National Park Service Organic Act of 1916 established the National Park 
Service, and required the Secretary of the Interior to maintain national parks and 
provide facilities and services for their public enjoyment through concessionaries 
or otherwise.66 
 The enactment of the Wilderness Act of 196467 brought the clearest 
recognition of the special values inhering in the natural environment that need 
protection. The Act mandated the federal agencies manage wilderness areas to 
 62 National Park Service Management: Hearing on H.R. 434 and H.R. 8668 Before the 
Subcomm. on National Parks, Recreation and Public Lands of the H. Res. Comm, 109th Cong. (2005) 
(testimony of John Wade, Chair, Coalition of National Park Service Retirees).
 63 See Winks, supra note 30, at 615. The proposed revisions to the NPS operations manual 
seemingly purports to lift use to the equivalent value of conservation. See id. at 615.
 64 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd–668ee (2012). These preserves are now administered by the 
National Wildlife Refuge System. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(1) (2012).
 65 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2012). Congress has limited the power of the President to designate lands 
as monuments in two states: Wyoming, 16 U.S.C. § 431a (prohibiting further designations without 
express congressional approval) and Alaska, 16 U.S.C. § 3213(a) (requiring congressional approval 
for designations exceeding 5,000 acres).
 66 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). The Act seemed to express two arguably conflicting ends: 
conservation and public enjoyment. Winks, supra note 30, at 603. It requires the Secretary of the 
Interior to maintain national parks and provide facilities and services for their public enjoyment 
through concessionaries or otherwise. See 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). The preamble to the Act states the 
aims as: “to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wildlife therein and 
to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them 
unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.” Id. Winks reconciles the apparent conflict by 
finding the aim of the Act was to conserve the scenic, natural, and historic resources, and the wildlife 
found in conjunction with those resources, in such a way as to leave them unimpaired, and that this 
mission had and has precedence over providing means of access, if those means impair the resources, 
however much access may add to the enjoyment of future generations. Id.; Winks, supra note 30, 
at 613.
 67 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131–36 (2012).
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“leave them unimpaired for future use and enjoyment as wilderness, and so as to 
provide for the protection of these areas [and] the preservation of their wilderness 
character;”68 and that “wilderness areas . . . be devoted to the public purposes of 
recreational, scenic, scientific, educational, conservation, and historical use.”69 
 The current land policy emphasizes management of multiple uses and 
preservation.70 In 1976, Congress enacted sweeping legislation with a mandate to 
the land management agencies for comprehensive land use planning. The Federal 
Land Management Policy Act of 1976 (“FLPMA”) provided the BLM with land 
management responsibilities, and with permanent, comprehensive guidelines 
for carrying out its mandate.71 FLPMA requires land use planning for public 
lands under BLM’s jurisdiction and outlines procedures for the development, 
 68 16 U.S.C. § 1131 (2012).
 69 16 U.S.C. § 1133(b) (2012). See also Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1405, 1414 (10th 
Cir. 1990) (acknowledging that the Act placed duties on Secretary of Agriculture to protect 
wilderness areas, but rejecting argument that fulfillment required particular actions, such as 
litigation to enforce reserved water rights). National wilderness areas were originally endowed 
with 9.1 million acres of national forest lands; now there are more than 100 million acres called 
wilderness. v.v. donn, puBLic LandS: cuRRent iSSueS and peRSpectiveS 140–41 (2003). The Act 
prohibits commercial recreational activities, motorized access, roads (temporary and permanent), 
structures, facilities, commercial enterprises, but allows mineral exploration if compatible with 
preservation of wilderness environment. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (2012). Litigation has all but stalled 
leasing and mineral exploration. In the last several decades, the land management agencies have 
adopted policies applicable to other public lands, aimed at conservation, including roadless areas 
regulations that prohibit road construction and reconstruction in 58.5 million acres of inventoried 
forest roadless areas and in 20.5 million acres in national forest, prohibiting roads in 42.4 million 
acres of wilderness/wild/scenic river corridors (although with significant exception); prohibiting 
timber harvests; and requiring measures to minimize adverse environment impact. See 36 C.F.R. 
§ 294 (2001) (Roadless Area Conservation); Holly L. Fretwell, Public Lands: Is No Use Good Use? 
puBLic LandS, 9 (PERC ed., 2001); Robert L. Glicksman, Traveling in Opposite Directions: Roadless 
Area Management Under the Clinton and Bush Administrations, 34 envtL. L. 1143, 1146, 1149, 
1158 (2004).
 70 See 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c) (2012); see also Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 16 
U.S.C. §§ 528–531 (2012) (directing the Forest Service to manage national forests for “multiple 
use and sustained yield of the several products and services obtained therefrom,” 16 U.S.C. § 529 
(2012), and placing “outdoor recreation, range, timber, water, and wildlife and fish on an equal 
footing.”). michaeL p. domBecK, chRiStopheR a. Wood, & JacK e. WiLLiamS, FRom conqueSt 
to conSeRvation: ouR puBLic LandS Legacy 24 (2003)).
 71 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1787 (2012). FLPMA contains specific provisions governing the 
disposition of classifications and withdrawals in effect at its enactment: they remain in force until 
modified under the new provisions and direct the BLM to review all existing classifications and 
withdrawals in the eleven contiguous western states by 1991. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701(a)(3); 1714(l)(1) 
(2012). The Department may modify or terminate any existing classification in a manner consistent 
with a land use plan developed under the Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1712 (d) (2012); and the Department 
may revoke withdrawals, but only in accordance with the Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1714(a) (2012).
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maintenance, and revisions of land use plans.72 The federal policy stated in 
FLPMA is that lands should “be retained unless, because of the land use planning 
procedure provided by the Act, it is determined that disposal of a particular parcel 
will serve the national interest.”73 
 In addition, the Act requires:
Public lands be managed in a manner that will protect the quality 
of scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, air 
and atmospheric, water resource, and archeological values; that 
where appropriate, will preserve and protect certain public lands 
in their natural condition; that will provide food and habitat for 
fish and wildlife and domestic animals; and that will provide for 
outdoor recreation and human occupancy and use.74 
In carrying out these directives, the BLM is charged with managing the lands 
in a manner which recognizes the public’s need for natural resources,75 by 
developing management plans, including a consideration of: “use [of ] a systematic 
interdisciplinary approach to achieve integrated consideration of physical, 
biological, economic, and others sciences . . . , giv[ing] priority to the designation 
and protection of areas of critical environmental concern . . . , [and] weigh[ing] 
long-term benefits to the public against short-term benefits.”76
 All of these acts and directives reflect a profound reverence for our nation’s 
natural assets and a commitment to their preservation for an inspired, transcendent 
existence by the public. 
 72 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701(a)(2), 1712 (2012). 
 73 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(1) (2012). The Act contains additional policy guidelines for BLM’s 
land use planning, i.e., that management must be “on the basis of multiple use and sustained yield 
unless otherwise specified by law.” 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(7).
 74 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8) (2012).
 75 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(12) (2012). With regard to land classifications performed earlier under 
the Classification and Multiple Use Act of 1964, Congress provided that existing classifications, 
withdrawals, and reservations would remain in effect until modified by the BLM and directed the 
BLM to review all such classifications and withdrawals in the eleven western states by 1991. See 43 
U.S.C. § 1714(l)(1) (2012). The BLM was also directed to develop a land use plan for all public 
lands, “regardless of whether such lands previously [had] been classified, withdrawn, set aside, or 
otherwise designated for one or more uses.” 43 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (2012). The BLM may modify or 
terminate any existing classification, and may revoke a withdrawal in a manner consistent with the 
land use plan developed under the Act. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(a) (2012). 
 76 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c) (2012).
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vi. oppoRtuniSm and inteRFeRence
A. Access As A Fundamental Public Value
 Despite the inherent existential values of the public lands, it can scarcely be 
argued that access to them by the general public animated early federal land policy. 
While Congress was not entirely oblivious to the problems of access through 
abutting private parcels that would arise under the early land disposal policy, 
perhaps naively, it believed that notions of neighborliness and comity would be 
sufficient to resolve any access problem that might arise. There was also a fully 
developed body of common law principles in place that provided for rights of way 
to landowners needing access across another’s land. But before anyone realized it, 
millions of acres of federal land became essentially landlocked. Congress acted, 
but only after the knotty system of landholdings became manifest. Beginning in 
1891, Congress passed a series of acts giving the president the power to reserve 
certain public lands from sale, disposition, or settlement. These included the 
Act of March 3, 1891, under which President Cleveland issued a proclamation 
reserving approximately twenty million acres as forestlands.77 Recognizing 
that the reservations covered by the proclamation could lead to blocked access 
by existing homesteaders to their holdings, Congress passed the Forest Service 
Organic Administration Act.78 The Act ensured access over national forest land 
to “actual settlers” and “protect[ed] whatever rights and licenses with regard to 
the public domain existed prior to the reservation.”79 In 1895, to facilitate federal 
access to public lands, Congress authorized the Secretary of the Interior to enter 
into reciprocal right of way agreements with private property owners, that is, an 
exchange of grants between the United States and a private landowner, under 
which each party could use the other’s existing roads and could construct roads 
over the other’s land.80
 Although FLPMA did not direct the land management agencies to 
obtain public access, one section provides specific authority to the Secretary 
of Agriculture and the Secretary of Interior to acquire access over non-federal 
 77 Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 561, § 24, 26 Stat. 1103 (repealed 1976). See also Mont. 
Wilderness Ass’n v. United States Forest Serv., 496 F. Supp. 880, 888 (D. Mont. 1980), aff ’d on 
other grounds, 655 F. 2d 951 (9th Cir. 1981).
 78 Forest Service Organic Administration Act, ch. 2, 30 Stat. 11, 34–35 (1897) (codified at 
16 U.S.C. § 473–482 (2012)).
 79 Montana Wilderness Ass’n, 496 F. Supp. at 888 (internal citation omitted).
 80 43 C.F.R. § 2812.0–3, –6 (2013) (explaining current authorization and policy). See also 
Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502, 1509 (9th Cir. 1995) (validating reciprocal right of way 
agreement and finding agreement entered into before passage of endangered species act not subject 
to act’s procedural requirements); Adams v. United States, 255 F.3d 787, 793–94 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(finding inholders in national forests may be required to provide a reciprocal grant of access to the 
government, as deemed necessary for the management of adjacent federal land).
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lands by purchase, exchange,81 donation, or use of eminent domain or 
condemnation.82 In many respects, FLPMA was a “this for that” act, while giving 
the agencies powers to acquire and transfer rights, it took away the power of 
local entities to construct roads in public lands.83 Under FLPMA, Congress 
 81 The land agencies have often secured access to federal lands through land exchanges. The 
BLM and the Forest Service have nearly identical purposes and procedures for land exchanges. 
Report to the Subcommittee on Interior, Environment & Related Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, 
House of Representatives, GAO-09-611 (June 2009); BLM & the Forest Service Have Improved 
Oversight of the Land Exchange Process, but Additional Actions Are Needed, GAO-09-611 (June 
2012). Both agencies’ regulations specify that exchanges are discretionary, and must be in the 
public interest. Id. at 4; 36 C.F.R. § 254.3(a), (b) (2012). The lands exchanged are usually of 
equal value, 36 C.F.R. § 254.3(c) (2012), or equalized by payments of up to twenty-five percent 
of the total value, 36 C.F.R. § 254.12(b) (2012), and must be within the same state, 36 C.F.R. 
§ 254.3(d) (2012). Report to the Subcommittee on Interior, Environment, & Related Agencies 
supra note 81, at 5–6. Newly-acquired federal lands within designated areas are to be included as 
part of those areas. 36 C.F.R. § 254.3(f ) (2012); Report to the Subcommittee on Interior, Environment, 
& Related Agencies supra note 81, at 5. Exchanges cannot be considered if they are not consistent 
with the land management plans, 36 C.F.R. § 254.3(f ) (2012), and each agency is to conduct an 
environmental analysis, under NEPA, of the proposed exchange. 36 C.F.R. § 254.3(g); Report to 
the Subcommittee on Interior, Environment, & Related Agencies supra note 81, at 5. To further 
protect the public interest or otherwise restrict nonfederal uses, the agencies can reserve rights on 
or retain interests in the lands conveyed out of federal ownership. 36 C.F.R. § 254.3(h) (2012). 
Finally, the Forest Service is required to submit any exchange proposals with more than $150,000 
in land acquisition to Congress for oversight review. 36 C.F.R. §§ 254.3(k), 254.11(a)(2) (2012). 
The BLM is required to coordinate exchange proposals with state and local governments. 36 C.F.R. 
§ 254.8(a) (2012).
 82 43 U.S.C. § 1715 (2012). 
 83 Among other things, FLPMA repealed the RS 2477 program. 43 U.S.C. § 932 repealed 
by Fed. Land Pol’y and Mgmt. Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 706(a), 90 Stat. 2743 (1976). 
Notwithstanding the repeal, FLPMA preserved rights of way existing before October 21, 1976. Id.; 
see also 43 U.S.C. § 1769(a) (2012) (“Nothing in this subchapter shall have the effect of terminating 
any right-of-way or right-of-use heretofore issued, granted or permitted;” Pub. L. No. 94-579 at 
§ 701(a) (“Nothing in this Act, or in any amendments made by this Act, shall be construed as 
terminating any valid lease, permit, patent, right-of-way, or other land use right or authorization 
existing on the date of approval of this Act.”); Pub. L. No. 94-579 at § 701(h) (“All actions by the 
Secretary concerned under this Act shall be subject to valid existing rights.”).
The RS 2477 program was created in 1866, when Congress enacted legislation granting rights 
of way for the construction of highways over public lands. 43 U.S.C. § 932 (repealed 1976). RS 
2477 has been interpreted by the courts as applying only to lands deemed “public lands,” that is, 
lands subject to sale or other disposal under general law. See Bardon v. N. Pacific R.R. Co., 145 
U.S. 535, 538 (1892) (“All land, to which any claims or rights of others have attached, does not 
fall within the designation of ‘public land.’”); Barker v. Bd. Of Cnty. Comm’rs of the Cnty. of 
La Plata, Colo., 24 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1127 (D. Colo. 1998) (no RS 2477 if land that had been 
reserved before claim patented); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Cheyenne Cnty. v. Ritchey, 888 P.2d 
298, 300 (Colo. App. 1994) (“Public land, or land on the public domain, is land which is open to 
sale or other disposition under general laws.”); United States v. Jenks, 804 F. Supp. 232, 235–236 
(N.M. 1992) (roads created after Presidential Proclamation reserved land as national forest were not 
public roads under RS 2477). RS 2477 thereby excluded those lands to which any claims or rights 
of others have attached. Nicolas v. Grassle, 267 P. 196, 197 (Colo. 1928) (RS 2477 road perfected 
before homesteader took title); Greiner v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Park Cnty.,173 P. 719, 720 (Colo. 
1918) (RS 2477 right of way perfected before land reserved for school purposes); Sprague v. Stead, 
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“repealed over thirty statutes granting rights-of-way across federal lands and 
vested the Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior with authority ‘to grant, issue, 
or renew rights of way over [Forest Service and public lands] for roads, trails 
[and] highways.’”84 Congress believed inholders “had the right of access to their 
139 P. 544, 546 (Colo. 1914) (RS 2477 right of way superior to subsequent entry by homesteaders 
and other claimants). The Act provided for “highways” only for access to mining claims or to 
homesteads, but not for purely recreational purposes. Humboldt Cnty. v. United States, 684 F.2d 
1276, 1281–82 (9th Cir. 1982) (rejecting argument that right of way was available for recreational 
purposes and not for economic development). “Virtually all of the existing highways and roads 
in the West were originally established as RS 2477 rights-of-way.” Hearing on Rights of Way before 
The House of Representatives Subcommittee on National Parks, Forests, and Lands of the Committee on 
Resources, 104th Cong. (1995). “Much of the transportation system in the West is still based on 
RS 2477 rights.” Id. Although no new RS 2477 right-of-way can now be created, (since the repeal 
of the law by FLPMA), “existing RS 2477 roads continue to make possible a variety of activities, 
such as delivery of goods to market, transportation between communities, tourism and recreational 
opportunities, provision of access routes for emergency vehicles, mail delivery, law enforcement, 
and access to lands for business and industrial purposes.” Hearing on RS 2477 Settlement Act before 
The Senate Energy and Natural Res. Comm., at *3 (1996) (testimony prepared by Barbara Hejelle). 
FLPMA rights-of-way can be obtained in the place of RS 2477 rights. See 43 U.S.C. § 1769 
(2012). However, trading an RS 2477 right-of-way for a FLPMA right-of-way would be beneficial 
for a federal land manager, but unfavorable for the one needing access. Hearing on RS 2477 
Settlement Act before The Senate Energy and Natural Res. Comm. at *3. There are several reasons why 
FLPMA rights of way are less advantageous. 
First, FLPMA rights-of-way are issued according to the discretion of the federal land 
manager. (In the past [sixteen] years, according to the Bureau of Land Management, 
only [thirty-six] miles of road right-of-way have been issued on public land in 
Washington County, Utah, which contains 1,550,000 acres, of which about [seventy 
percent] is federally owned. Washington County holds title to approximately 800 
RS 2477 rights-of-way. Given the difficulties associated with obtaining FLPMA 
rights-of-way, it would take decades to regain even a portion of these public roads 
through FLPMA procedures.) But, RS 2477 rights-of-way, already vested in the 
holder, are capable of being utilized immediately, and are subject to constitutional 
protections. Second, permissible uses of FLPMA rights-of-way may, in some cases, 
be more limited than are uses of RS 2477 rights-of-way, because these rights pre-exist 
subsequent withdrawals. (The right to perform safety improvements on an existing 
road adjacent to a wilderness study area or traversing a national park is of critical 
importance to the public, which relies upon these rights-of-way for safe travel across 
the federal domain.) Third, FLPMA permits are more in the nature of a license; they 
are not perpetual as are RS 2477 rights-of-way. And, lastly, FLPMA rights-of-way 
must be purchased, whereas RS 2477 rights-of-way are already owned.
Id. at *3–4. For this reason “Congress explicitly forbade Interior from forcing such an exchange.” 
Id. at *3. A compelling reason for repealing the RS 2477 law was that pre-existing rights-of-way 
are vested property rights and no longer part of the federal domain. Thus, to regain ownership of 
these rights, Congress would have to pay the owners. Id. Reading RS 2477 too broadly could lead 
to unwarranted claims for roads for access across private property, and most concernedly over Indian 
and Indian and Alaska Native lands. 
 84 Fitzgerald v. United States, 932 F. Supp. 1195, 1201 (Ariz. 1996) (citing 43 U.S.C. 
§ 1761(a) (2012)).
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[inholdings] subject to reasonable regulation under . . . FLPMA.”85 However, the 
express terms of FLPMA seemed to preclude the granting of access across public 
lands subject to wilderness restrictions, which left wilderness inholders, in a rather 
precarious position.86 Congress responded with the enactment of Section 3210(a) 
of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980 (“ANILCA”),87 
which guarantees to inholders a threshold “right of access to their lands subject to 
reasonable regulation [under FLPMA] by . . . the Secretary of Agriculture in the 
case of national forest [lands].”88
 85 S. Rep. No. 413, 2d Sess., at 310 (1980) reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5070, 5254 
(reviewing access rights of inholders under FLPMA and explaining need for Alaska National Interest 
Lands Conservation Act of 1980, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101–3709 (2012) (“ANILCA”)).
 86 43 U.S.C. § 1761(a) (the “Secretary of Agriculture, with respect to lands within the 
National Forest System (except . . . land designated as wilderness), [is] authorized to grant . . . 
rights of way over, upon, under, or through such lands . . . .”); see also United States v. Srnsky, 
271 F.3d 595, 601 (4th Cir. 2001). While these rights of way, would be created within the limits 
of the statute, nothing in the Organic Administration Act, FLPMA, or ANILCA, dealt with state 
common law rules on access. FLPMA authorized the federal government to grant rights-of-way, 
but does not authorize the regulation of existing easements. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1761(a), 1764(c) (2012). 
Further, while amendments to the Organic Act provided that if the Secretary wished to impose 
rules and regulations on any easements reserved to the grantor, they must appear in the instrument, 
they contained nothing precluding implied reservation. Srnsky, 271 F.3d at 601–02 (quoting the 
Weeks Act, 16 U.S.C. § 518 (2013)). ANILCA merely authorizes the Forest Service to grant rights 
of way to inholders, but does not purport to affect existing rights under state law. Id. In United 
States v. Jenks, the court held that the access guaranteed by the Homestead Act did not create a 
property interest known as an implied easement. 129 F.3d 1348 (10th Cir. 1997). In Adams v. 
United States, the court held that FLPMA and ANILCA applied, thus preempting state common 
law. 3 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 1993). However, the landowners did not take their interests pursuant to 
a federal statute, rather they deeded part of their land to the federal government. Thus, state law 
applies, unless it is “aberrant or hostile” to federal interests. Srnsky, 271 F.3d at 604 (quoting United 
States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 596 (1973)). The regulations themselves 
provide specifically that they “do not affect . . . the rights reserved in conveyances to the United 
States.” Id. at 604 (citing 36 C.F.R. § 251.110(b) (2012)). Yet, conveyances should be read to include 
all rights arising whether expressly or by implication. Srnsky, 271 F.3d at 604. But see McFarland v. 
Kempthorne, 545 F.3d 1106, 1110–11 (9th Cir. 2008) (“federal law governs a claim of easement 
over lands owned by the United States;” “strong [public] federal interest in the management of 
federal lands weighs against the importation of state law.”).
 87 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101–3233 (2012).
 88 ANILCA provides that
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and subject to such terms and conditions 
as the Secretary of Agriculture may prescribe, the Secretary shall provide such access to 
nonfederally owned land within the boundaries of the National Forest System as the 
Secretary deems adequate to secure to the owner the reasonable use and enjoyment 
thereof: Provided, That such owner comply with rules and regulations applicable to 
ingress and egress to or from the National Forest System.
16 U.S.C. § 3210(a) (2012). The courts have read the legislative history of ANILCA to evince an 
intent by Congress that “such owners ha[ve] [a] right of access to their lands subject to reasonable 
regulation by . . . the Secretary of Agriculture in the case of national forests . . . under [FLPMA].” 
Adams v. United States, 3 F.3d 1254, 1258 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5070, 
5254). Section 1764(c) of FLPMA further provides that, 
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 Pursuant to ANILCA, the Forest Service and BLM have adopted regulations 
providing property owners with access that is adequate to secure reasonable use 
and enjoyment of their property.89 “Adequate access” to an inholding is defined 
in BLM regulations as “a route and method of access to non-Federal land that 
provides for reasonable use and enjoyment of the non-Federal land consistent with 
similarly situated non-Federal land and that minimizes damage or disturbance to 
National Forest System lands and resources.”90
 The burden on a private landowner to establish an easement over federal 
land to get to a private inholding is not an easy one. Indeed, courts have been 
reluctant to find such easements, although they have recognized a right of access 
“[r]ights-of-way shall be granted, issued, or renewed pursuant to . . . such regulations 
or stipulations, consistent with the provisions of this subchapter or any other 
applicable law, and shall also be subject to the terms and conditions as the Secretary 
concerned may prescribe regarding extent, duration, survey, location, construction, 
maintenance, transfer or assignment, and termination.” 
43 U.S.C. § 1764(c) (2012). See United States v. Jenks, 129 F.3d 1348, 1351 (10th Cir. 1997) 
(upholding Department of Agriculture’s power to require permit of inholder for use of access road 
for ingress and egress to land within national forest, but recognizing that inholder might have 
patent or common law right of access apart from statute). Section 3210(a) of ANILCA applies to 
all National Forest System lands, not just those in Alaska. See Mont. Wilderness Ass’n v. United 
States, 655 F.2d 951, 957 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982); see also H.R. Rep No. 
1521 (2d Sess. 1980) (implying that 3210(a) applies outside of Alaska by concluding that provision 
in Colorado Wilderness Act pertaining to access to non-federally owned lands was unnecessary 
because of Section 3210(a) of ANILCA). 
 89 See 36 C.F.R. § 251.110(c) (2013); 43 C.F.R. § 2802.10 (2013). The regulations of 
both agencies authorize terms, conditions, or stipulations for the right-of-way or easement being 
granted and reflect statutory authority in this regard. The BLM regulations specifically requires: an 
environmental analysis in accordance with National Environmental Policy Act; a determination that 
the applicant’s proposed plans comply with applicable state and federal law; and consultation with 
all other Federal, State, and local agencies having an interest, as appropriate. 43 C.F.R. § 2805.12 
(2013). The Forest Service regulations governing land use specify that “authority to construct and/
or use facilities and structures on National Forest System lands for access to non-Federal lands” 
requires a special-use permit or road-use permit. 36 C.F.R. § 251.113 (2013). Section 251.114(a) 
further specifies considerations in such a special-use authorization: 
In issuing a special-use authorization for access to non-Federal lands, the authorized 
officer shall authorize only those access facilities or modes of access that are needed for 
the reasonable use and enjoyment of the land and that minimize the impacts on the 
Federal resources. The authorizing officer shall determine what constitutes reasonable 
use and enjoyment of the lands based on contemporaneous uses made of similarly 
situated lands in the area and any other relevant criteria.
36 C.F.R. § 251.114(a) (2013).
 90 36 C.F.R. §§ 251.111, 251.114(a) (2013).
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under various federal statutes. 91 In Fitzgerald v. United States, plaintiffs sought 
to quiet title to an easement across public lands to get to their inholdings within 
a national forest.92 The United States had insisted that the plaintiffs apply for 
and obtain a special use authorization to use a road then located on public 
land.93 The court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that they held an easement for 
ingress and egress to their inholding, ruling that the facts required to establish an 
easement by necessity were not present.94 Further, the court held that there was 
no easement by implication as “nothing passes by implication in a public grant.”95 
Nor could the language of the deed be said to create an express easement by the 
word “appurtenance,” because the road claimed as the easement was not shown 
to have been in existence at the time of the patent.96 Nonetheless, the court found 
a number of statutory bases for a right of access to the inholders’ land, subject to 
rules and regulations imposed by the government.97
 91 Access pursuant to FLPMA and ANILCA precludes claims for common law easements. 
Adams v. United States, 3 F. 3d 1254, 1259 (9th Cir. 1993) (common law claims are preempted 
by ANILCA and FLPMA when . . . the United States owns the servient estate for the benefit of 
the public); Adams v. United States, 255 F.3d 787, 795 (9th Cir. 2001) (while inholders had a 
right of access under FPLMA and ANILCA, such right was subject to reasonable regulations); 
McFarland v. Kempthorne, 545 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008) (Park Service holds the authority to 
regulate access).
 92 Fitzgerald v. United States, 932 F. Supp. 1195 (D. Ariz. 1996).
 93 Id. at 1199. 
 94 Id. at 1202.
 95 Id. at 1203 (citing Albrecht v. United States, 831 F.2d 196, 198 (10th Cir. 1987)). 
 96 Id. at 1203.
 97 Id. at 1200–03. The statutes considered by the court included the Homestead Act of 1862, 
ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (1862) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 161–284 (repealed 1976)) (providing for 
implied license to use public lands to settlers); The Forest Reserve Act of 1891, ch. 561, § 24, 26 
Stat. 1103 (1891) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 471 (repealed 1976)) (empowering the President to 
reserve forest lands); the Forest Service Organic Administration Act of 1897, ch. 2, 30 Stat. 34 
(1897) (codified at 6 U.S.C. §§ 473–482, 551 (2012)) (authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture 
“to make rules and regulations for the protection of the national forests,” but preserving “the right 
of access over Forest Service lands to ‘actual settlers’ residing within the boundaries of the National 
Forest”); the Black Mesa Forest Reserve, which reserved land for the Black Mesa Forest Reserve, the 
national forest at issue; the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 
2743 (1976) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1784 (2012)) (giving the Secretaries of Agriculture 
and Interior the authority “to grant, issue, or renew rights of way over [Forest Service and public 
lands] for . . . roads, trails . . . ”, and preserving rights of way existing at the time of enactment) 
(alteration in original); the Alaska National Interest Land Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-487, 
94 Stat. 2371 (1980) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 3210 (2012)) (directing “the Secretary [to provide] 
such access to non-federally owned land within the boundaries of the National Forest System as 
the Secretary deems adequate to secure to the owner the reasonable use and enjoyment thereof; 
Provided, that such owner comply with rules and regulations applicable to ingress and egress to or 
from the National Forest System.”). In addition, the court found that the regulations promulgated 
by the Forest Service provided for the issuance of special use permit for access to inholdings to 
ensure reasonable use and enjoyment of the property, but requiring that the landowner demonstrate 
“a lack of any existing rights or routes of access available by deed or under State or common law.” 
Fitzgerald, 932 F. Supp. at 1202 (referring to 36 C.F.R. § 251.114(f ) (2013)).
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 In recent years, in recognition of past shortsightedness in land disposition, 
when authorizing land purchases or exchanges, Congress has required as a 
condition of conveyances, provisions in conveyance instruments guaranteeing 
public access to federal lands by reservation of easements.98 Most significantly, the 
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (“ANCSA”),99 required that when Native 
Alaskans withdrew tracts of land from the public domain, as reserved for the 
natives, such selection was subject to the obligation of providing access to the 
public to adjoining public lands.100
B. Unlawful Inclosures
 Perhaps Congress’ most significant acknowledgement of the pernicious effects 
of the checkerboard pattern of land disposition was the passage of the Unlawful 
Inclosures Act.101 The Act declares enclosures of federal lands to be unlawful and 
 98 See, e.g., S. 2904, 108th Cong. (2d Sess. 2004) (“A Bill to authorize the exchange of certain 
land in the State of Colorado.”). Section 5 of this Bill is entitled “Exchange Terms and Conditions 
“ and states in part, 
(d)(1) Conditions on conveyance of Crystal River parcel . . . , (i)(I) provide public 
access to the parcel; and . . . (2) Conditions on conveyance of wild wood parcel . . .  
(B) Reservation of Easement. –In the deed of conveyance of the parcel described 
in Section 3(3)(A) to the County, or at request of the County, to the Aspen Valley 
Land Trust, the Secretary shall, as determined to be appropriate by the Secretary in 
consultation with the County, reserve to the United States a permanent easement to 
the parcel for the location, construction, and public use of the East of Aspen Trail.
Id.; see also S. 161, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005) (“A Bill to Provide for a land exchange in the State 
of Arizona between the Secretary of Agriculture and Yavapai Ranch Limited Partnership.”). Section 
102(f )(2) provides “[u]pon completion of the land exchange under this title, the Secretary and the 
Yavapai Ranch shall grant each other at no charge reciprocal easements for access and utilities across, 
over, and through [the lands].” 
 99 Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (1971) (codified at 
43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1629(e) (2012)).
 100 Id. at § 1616(d)(3) (reserving to Secretary the authority to grant rights of way); § 1636(b)
(2) (reserving public access in land banking program). See also Stratman v. Watt, 656 F.2d 1321, 
1324 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding public access under original § 1616(b)).
 101 Section 1 of the Act states that “[a]ll inclosures of any public lands . . . constructed by any 
person . . . to any of which land included within the inclosure the person . . . had no claim or color 
of title made or acquired in good faith . . . are hereby declared to be unlawful.” 43 U.S.C.
43 U.S.C. § 1061 (2012). Section 3 provides:
[n]o person, by force, threats, intimidation, or by any fencing or inclosing, or any 
other unlawful means, shall prevent or obstruct, or shall combine and confederate 
with others to prevent or obstruct, any person from peaceably entering upon or 
establishing a settlement or residence on any tract of public land subject to settlement 
or entry under the public land laws of the United States, or shall prevent or obstruct 
free passage or transit over or through the public lands: Provided, This section shall 
not be held to affect the right or title of persons, who have gone upon, improved, or 
occupied said lands under the land laws of the United States, claiming title thereto, 
in good faith.
43 U.S.C. § 1063 (2012).
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orders that such enclosures be removed.102 Two notable Supreme Court cases 
have examined the Act to determine its purport—one ancient and another very 
modern. First, in Camfield v. United States, a landowner constructed a fence on 
his odd-numbered lots to enclose twenty thousand acres of public land, thereby 
appropriating it to the exclusive use of the landowner and his associates.103 The 
Court, citing nuisance law, concluded that the Act was an appropriate exercise 
of the police power in addressing what could be considered a nuisance.104 The 
Court explained that while the federal government has the rights of an ordinary 
proprietor over lands including the power to sell or give away land, “it would 
be recreant to its duties as trustee for the people of the United States to permit 
any individual or private corporation to monopolize them for private gain, 
and thereby practically drive intending settlers from the market.”105 Building 
“fences upon public lands with intent to inclose them for private use would be 
a mere trespass,” which the government could abate. But since this right existed 
without the Act, something more was intended to be addressed by it.106 Here, 
the defendant landowner erected the fence near the outside line of the odd-
numbered sections, which was unobjectionable, but insofar “as they were erected 
immediately outside the even-numbered sections, they [were] manifestly intended 
to inclose the government’s lands.”107 The purposes of the structure were obvious 
and amounted to a nuisance, since the grant of the odd-numbered sections to the 
railroads was not also a grant of the indefinite exclusive use of the even-numbered 
sections. Congress intended the public lands to remain open.108 If the defendants 
“chose to assume the risk of purchasing the odd-numbered sections . . . without 
also purchasing, or obtaining the consent of the government to use, the even-
numbered sections,” thereby deriving no benefit from the odd-numbered ones, it 
was the result of their own indiscretion.109
 Yet, the Court affirmed the grantee’s right to fence completely his own land.110 
The Court stated: 
So long as the individual proprietor confines his enclosure to his 
own land, the government has no right to complain, since he is 
 102 Id.
 103 Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 519 (1897).
 104 Id. at 526.
 105 Id. at 524.
 106 Id.
 107 Id. at 526.
 108 Camfield, 167 U.S. at 525. 
 109 Camfield, 167 U.S. at 527 (“the evil of permitting persons, who owned or controlled the 
alternate sections, to enclose the entire tract, and thus to exclude or frighten off intending settlers 
finally became so great that congress passed the act . . . forbidding all enclosures of public lands, and 
authorizing the abatement of the fences”). Id. at 524–25.
 110 Id. at 528.
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entitled to the complete and exclusive enjoyment of it, regardless 
of any detriment to his neighbor; but when, under the guise of 
inclosing his own land, he builds a fence which is useless for that 
purpose, and can only have been intended to inclose the lands 
of the government, he is plainly within the statute, and is guilty 
of an unwarrantable appropriation of that which belongs to the 
public at large.111 
The Court noted that obviously, if odd-numbered lots are individually fenced, the 
access to even-numbered lots is obstructed.112
 Nearly a century later, the Court was once again called upon to interpret 
the Act. In Leo Sheep Co. v. United States,113 the Court rejected the assertion 
that there was a violation of the Act by a landowner who refused to allow the 
government to build an access road across its property allowing the public to 
reach a reservoir on public land.114 The Court began by instructing that the Act 
was enacted in “response to the ‘range wars,’ the legendary struggle between 
cattlemen and farmers during the last half of the nineteenth century” by which 
cattlemen, “[b]y placing fences near the borders of their parts of the checkerboard 
[pattern of railroad grants], could fence in thousands of acres of public lands.”115 
The prohibitions under the Act, however, did not cover the landowner’s objection 
to a public road over its land.116 The Court went on to distinguish Camfield, 
which was relied upon by the Government. It found that Camfield expressed the 
view that the authority of a landowner to completely fence in his lot “was of 
little practical significance ‘since a separate enclosure of each section would only 
become desirable when the country had been settled, and roads had been built 
which would give access to each section.’”117 But, upon whose land could roads 
 111 Id. at 528.
 112 Id. at 527–28.
 113 Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668 (1979).
 114 Id. at 685–86. Because of the checkerboard configuration of the lots it was physically 
impossible to enter the Seminoe Reservoir sector without some minimum physical intrusion upon 
private land. Id. at 678.
 115 Id. at 684–85. When Congress began conveying land to the railroads for the construction 
of a transcontinental line, it granted to railroads either odd-numbered or even-numbered lots, 
which adjoined each other. As a consequence, the owner of an odd-numbered section could not go 
from one of its tracks to another without committing a trespass over an even-numbered lot owned 
by another. The purpose of this scheme was to help fund the construction of the railroad through 
free grants to the railroad of odd-numbered lots. Id. at 672–73. At first extending ten miles, then 
later expanding to twenty miles along the railway right-of-way for each mile of track constructed, 
reserving and then selling to the public even-numbered lots at prices as high as would have been 
generated by a sale of the whole area. Id. at 676–77.
 116 Id. at 684.
 117 Id. at 686. (quoting Camfield, 167 U.S. at 528).
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be built if there were no express reservations in the conveyances? What if the 
adjoining landowners could not reach an agreement on the price of a right of way? 
Would these not frustrate settlement?
 In Bergen v. Lawrence,118 the Tenth Circuit interpreted the Unlawful Inclosures 
Act, finding that while it declares an enclosure of public land a nuisance, it does 
not create an easement for either wildlife or humans.119 There, a landowner 
constructed a fence twenty-eight miles long that, because of the checkerboard 
pattern of land grants, enclosed approximately 9,600 acres of public land, in 
addition to his own land.120 The fence prevented access by antelope and, during 
the winter, a number of antelope starved to death because they could not gain 
access to the public grazing land.121 The government sought an order compelling 
removal of the fence.122 The court ruled that a landowner was not free to do as 
he wished on his own land at the expense of the public if that meant enclosing 
federal lands. Instead, if the Act were so construed as applying only to fences 
actually erected upon public lands, it would be “manifestly unnecessary, since 
the Government as an ordinary proprietor would have the right to prosecute 
for such a trespass.”123 “It is only by treating it as prohibiting all ‘enclosures’ of 
public lands, by whatever means, that the act becomes of any avail.”124 At the 
same time, the order that the fence be removed did not impose a “servitude” on 
the private land, but rather abated a nuisance.125 The court pointed out that the 
landowner “retain[ed] the right to exclude the antelope at [any] time because the 
district court did not find any implied easement for antelope.”126 If the landowner 
attempted such exclusion, “an action might be brought claiming such an easement 
or servitude.”127 The two positions cannot be reconciled: having to take down the 
fence that blocked access to public lands does not create a servitude over private 
land; yet, the antelope will have to cross private land to get to the public land on 
which the private land borders? 
 Bergen relied upon Camfield’s128 caution that although an individual proprietor 
may confine his enclosure to his own land, leaving the government with no right 
 118 United States ex rel. Bergen v. Lawrence, 848 F.2d 1502 (10th Cir. 1988).
 119 Id. at 1505.
 120 Id. at 1504.
 121 Id.
 122 Id.
 123 Id. at 1505 (quoting Camfield, 167 U.S. at 525). 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. at 1507 n.7.
 127 Id.
 128 Id. at 1508.
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to complain, he may not “build[] a fence which is useless for that purpose, and 
can only have been intended to enclose the lands of the government.”129 
C. Fencing Out Interferes With Common Law Accommodation Regimes
 Even if the Unlawful Inclosures Act cannot entirely prevent abutting owners 
from putting up fences that block access, evolving conceptions of property rights 
as relational and contingent might provide an opening. Blacksone’s conception 
of property ownership as “sole and despotic dominion” is a myth.130 Property is 
community and the law of property has developed many ways to accommodate 
the often antagonistic interests of neighbors, to enable productive uses of land. 
While nuisance has long operated to curtail the conduct of a landowner, even 
on his own land, the common law also long-supported and enforced voluntary 
arrangements—either based upon expressed acts or implied intentions. Adjoining 
landowners have long perceived that their mutual economic or aesthetic interests 
can be well-served by agreements—either to allow the other use of his land or 
to restrict use of his land. An easement is such an agreement: a non-possessory 
interest in the land of another, giving the right to use or limit the owner from 
acts that might interfere with that use.131 An easement often grants a right to 
cross the land of another to get to some public thoroughfare. However, in many 
transactions, because these mutual interests are perhaps obvious, the one party 
(either the transferor or transferee), simply assumes her rights over the other’s 
lands will continue without the need for a specific grant or reservation of this 
right at the time of the transaction or purchase. In these instances, the common 
law operated to give effect to the parties’ presumed intentions and implied such 
a right to use.132 “[T]he parties are presumed to contract in reference to the 
condition of the property at the time of the sale and neither has a right, by altering 
arrangements then openly existing, to change materially the relative value of the 
respective parts.”133
 There are several theories for the creation of easements by implication, 
of these, prior use, also referred to as quasi-easement, and necessity are most 
common. An easement arising by prior use requires a showing that: (1) at one 
 129 Camfield, 167 U.S. at 528.
 130 John chRiStman, the myth oF pRopeRty: toWaRd an egaLitaRian theoRy oF oWneRShip 
18 (Oxford U. Press 1994). Indeed, recently, one writer has challenged this notion. See David B. 
Schorr, hoW BLacKStone Became a BLacKStonian,107-114, 123-126 (Berkeley Electronic Press, 
2008) (demonstrating all the ways that property was not absolute during and after Blackstone’s time). 
 131 ReStatement (thiRd) oF pRop.: SeRvitudeS § 1.2 (2000); LeonaRd a. JoneS, a tReatiSe 
on the LaW oF eaSementS: in continuation oF the authoR’S tReatiSe on the LaW oF ReaL 
pRopeRty § 1 (Baker et al. 1898); 4 poWeLL on ReaL pRopeRty, § 34.01 (2013).
 132 Manitowoc Remanufacturing, Inc. v. Vocque, 819 S.W.2d 275, 278 (Ark. 1991); Murphy 
v. Burch, 205 P.3d 289, 293 (Ca. 2009).
 133 Manitowoc Remanufacturing, Inc., 819 S.W.2d at 278 (internal citation omitted).
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point the putative servient and dominant tenements were owned by the same 
person; (2) the prior owner used one part to benefit the other; (3) the use was 
necessary; and (4) it was open, apparent, and visible.134 An easement arising by 
necessity requires a showing that: (1) at one point, the two parcels were under 
common ownership, and (2) at the time of severance, there was a necessity by one 
to use the other; most typically that the putative dominant estate is landlocked, 
having no way out to a public road.135 This theory is usually invoked in favor of a 
grantee of landlocked property, but has been held to apply where one sells lands 
surrounding other lands belonging to him, cutting off access to his remaining 
lands except over the land granted.136 This easement arises even though there is 
no such provision in his deed reserving rights over the lands conveyed and he 
conveys with covenants of warranty. In the latter case, the rule of strict necessity 
applies because the grantor is claiming something in derogation of the deed and 
the title that he has conveyed.137 The principle is if he intended to reserve any 
greater right over the land granted, it was his duty to expressly provide for the 
grant.138 Therefore, early courts required necessity to be strict, by a showing that 
the dominant owner would be landlocked without the easement; the public 
policy favoring productive uses of the land overcoming the grantor’s neglect.139 
The scope of that usage under an easement by necessity will have reference to 
those uses existing at the time the easement arose, but may be allowed to expand 
so that the easement holder can obtain reasonable use and enjoyment from 
her estate.140
 At the time the government began doling out public land, not expressly 
reserving a right of access, these principles were well established in the English 
common law and under state private property law. However, the federal 
government is not like any other private landowner. If nothing else, the Supreme 
Court has been evenhanded on the issue of the creation of easements where the 
federal government has been concerned, by requiring a clear expression of intent. 
 134 4 poWeLL on ReaL pRopeRty § 34.08. See Schwab v. Timmons, 589 N.W. 2d 1, 6 n.4 (Wis. 
1999) (citing 7 thompSon, ReaL pRopeRty § 60.03(b)(4)(i) (1994)); JoneS supra note 131, at § 126.
 135 Schwab, 589 N.W. 2d at 7. The courts have stated that mere geographical barriers 
obstructing access to a parcel, alone, does not establish the necessity required for an easement under 
this theory. 4 poWeLL on ReaL pRopeRty §34.07; JoneS supra note 131, at §315.
 136 Schwab, 589 N.W. 2d at 8.
 137 JoneS supra note 131, at §305–06; Bennett v. Evans, 74 N.W.2d 728, 816 (Neb. 1956); 
Adams v. Cullen, 268 P.2d 451, 508 (Wash. 1954).
 138 JoneS supra note 131, at §304.
 139 See, e.g., Schwab, 589 N.W.2d at 37; United States v. Rindge, 208 F. 611, 620–22 (S.D. 
Cal. 1913) (no easement by implication arose on behalf of the government where it was possible to 
build a road over the mountains even though it would be expensive to construct and would be steep 
and difficult and not as convenient or desirable as ways over private land). 
 140 John W. Weaver, Easements are Nuisances, 25 ReaL pRop. pRoB & tR. J. 103, 115–16, 
119–20, 144–45 (1990).
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In the case of a private landowner asserting an easement over federal land, the 
courts have ruled, “[a]n express easement must be expressly conveyed . . . [t]he 
intent to grant an easement [against the government] must be so manifest on 
the face of the instrument . . . that no other construction can be placed on it.”141 
On the other side of the coin, the Court has rejected an assertion of an implied 
easement in favor of the government. In Leo Sheep Co. v. United States,142 that 
same landowner who prevailed under the Unlawful Inclosures Act, also defeated 
a claim by the government for an implied easement over its land. The landowner 
owned a checkerboard section of formerly federal land granted to the Union 
Pacific Railroad,143 and charged fees to members of the public who sought to 
cross its lands to reach a federal reservoir. To stop this practice, the BLM built a 
road, mostly on federal land, that crossed the landowner’s property at the section 
corners.144 The landowner sought to quiet title against the United States alleging 
a taking of property without just compensation.145 The district court held for the 
landowner.146 The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that when the Government 
“granted the land to [the railroad], it implicitly reserved an easement to pass over 
the odd-numbered sections, [those conveyed to the railroad], in order to reach 
the even-numbered sections that were held by the Government.”147 The Supreme 
Court reversed.148 First, it pointed out that the government did not argue that 
there was an express reservation of a right to cross.149 Even though there were 
 141 Petroff v. Schafer, No. 08-1971, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32304, at *13–14 (D. Ariz. 
Apr. 1, 2009) (quoting Fitzgerald Living Trust v. United States, 460 F. 3d 1259, 1267 (9th Cir. 
2006)) (rejecting quiet title act claim by landowner successor to original patentee to rights in a strip 
reserved to the United States for a road, situated so as to provide access through the homestead 
conveyed to other National Forest Lands beyond the homestead, where nothing in the language 
of that reservation showed “an unmistakable intent to create an easement interest running to the 
homestead land;” instead, the documents simply referred to the government’s reservation of a 
“road,” or “roadway,” or a “road strip,” without mentioning any other interest created). See United 
States v. Balliet, 133 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1128 (W.D. Ark. 2001) (“[w]hile ‘[a]n implied easement 
can exist if [the United States] intended to grant an easement for access when it granted title to the 
[property] . . . [t]he general rule is that nothing passes by implication in a public grant.’” (quoting 
Fitzgerald v. United States, 932 F. Supp. 1195, 1202 (D. Ariz. 1996) (citing Albrecht v. United 
States, 831 F.2d 196, 198 (10th Cir. 1987))) (easement by necessity); United States v. Dunn, 478 
F.2d 443, 446 (9th Cir. 1973) (easement by necessity applies against the United States); Fitzgerald 
v. United States, 932 F. Supp. 1195, 1202 (D. Ariz. 1996) (no easement by necessity or implied 
easement against the United States).
 142 Leo Sheep Company v. United States, 440 U.S. 668 (1979).
 143 Id. at 677–78.
 144 Id. at 678.
 145 Id.
 146 Id.
 147 Id. The Court noted that the holding of the district court affected property in 150 million 
acres of land in the western United States and granted certiorari on that basis. Id.
 148 Id. at 688.
 149 Id. at 678.
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exceptions made in the grant, an express easement would have been a difficult 
argument given the purposes of the original grant to the railroad to facilitate the 
construction of a railroad line, and this would be better accomplished by a grant 
with few limitations.150 
 Instead, the Government argued that an “implicit reservation of the asserted 
easement [was] established by ‘settled rules of property law’ and by the Unlawful 
Inclosures Act.”151 The Supreme Court rejected that argument as well. Ordinarily, 
when a private landowner conveys to another a portion of his lands and retains 
the rest, leaving the remainder otherwise landlocked, it is presumed under 
common law that the grantor has reserved an easement to pass over the granted 
property—an “easement by necessity.”152 However, the Court determined that 
when the federal government is the grantor, there is no necessity because it has 
the power of eminent domain.153 The court noted that a number of western states 
had abandoned the theory of easement by necessity in the case of government 
grants in favor of condemnation with the payment of compensation to the 
servient landowner.154 Even if an easement by necessity were found to exist, the 
Court doubted that it would privilege the government to construct a road on the 
servient estate.155
 The Court discussed the two theories underlying the easement by necessity: 
(1) the intent of the parties,156 and (2) avoidance of useless and unproductive 
land.157 On the intent theory the Court was doubtful that Congress intended to 
reserve any rights in the grants to the railroads given that the grants contained 
express exceptions on other matters.158 At the same time, the Court acknowledged 
 150 Id. The only limitations here were that the grant was not to include land “‘sold, reserved, 
or otherwise disposed of by the United States,’ such as land to which there were homestead claims,” 
and mineral land claims. Id. Given these express exceptions, the “Court has in the past refused to 
add to this list by divining some ‘implicit’ congressional intent.” Id. at 679.
 151 Id. at 679; see also 43 U.S.C. § 1061 (2012).
 152 Leo Sheep Co., 440 U.S. at 679 (citing 3 poWeLL, the LaW oF ReaL pRopeRty, ¶ 410 
(1978)); Hollywyle Ass’n, Inc. v. Hollister, 324 A.2d 247, 252–53 (Conn. 1973) (discussing 
easements by necessity and their application).
 153 Leo Sheep Co., 440 U.S. at 679–80.
 154 Id. at 680.
 155 Id. at 679.
 156 Id. at 681; see also Schmidt v. Eger, 289 N.W.2d 851, 854 (Mich. App. 1980); Murphy v. 
Burch, 205 P.3d 289, 293 (Ca. 2009) (easement implied based upon implied intent “as determined 
from the terms of the relevant instrument and circumstances surrounding the transaction” and 
“grounded in the public policy that property should not be rendered unfit for occupancy or 
successful cultivation because access to the property is lacking.”). 
 157 Leo Sheep Co., 440 U.S. at 680; see also Murphy, 205 P.3d at 293.
 158 Id. at 681.
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that Congress might not have given much thought to the need for access, instead 
relying on “negotiation, reciprocity considerations, and the power of eminent 
domain as obvious devices for ameliorating disputes.”159 The Court refused to 
apply the rule of construction that all grants should be construed in favor of the 
government noting that the rule has not been applied “in its full vigor to grants 
under the Railroad Acts.”160 The rule should not apply “to defeat the intent of the 
legislature, or to withhold what is given either expressly or by necess[ity] or by fair 
implication.”161 In the case of an act of Congress: 
Operating as general law, and manifesting clearly the intention of 
Congress to secure public advantages, or to subserve the public 
interests and welfare by means of benefits more or less valuable, 
offers to individuals or to corporations as an inducement to 
undertake and accomplish great and expensive enterprises or 
works of a quasi public character in or through an immense 
and undeveloped public domain, such legislation stands upon 
a somewhat different footing from merely a private grant, and 
should receive at the hands of the court a more liberal construction 
in favor of the purposes from which is was enacted.162 
 Thus, in the Court’s view, that rule of construction would not help the 
Government. But, let us consider the intent of Congress. In the first instance, 
Congress sought to provide an inducement to investors to undertake the 
 159 Id. There was some account of a proposed amendment to the Congressional Act granting 
the land to the railroad that would assure “the right to the public to enter granted land and prospect 
for valuable minerals.” Id. at 682 n.18. That amendment was, however, defeated. Id. There were also 
debates on an earlier Pacific Railroad bill which suggested “that there be ‘a reservation in every grant 
of land that [the Government] shall have a right to go through it, and take it at proper prices to be 
paid hereafter.’” Id. “Apparently, the intended purpose of this proposed reservation was to permit 
railroads to obtain rights-of-way through granted property at the Government’s behest.” Id. The 
Court did not think this debate evinced “any prevailing assumption that the government implicitly 
reserved a right-of-way through granted lands.” Id.
 160 Id. at 682. Instead, the court referred to an 1885 decision which observed that
[t]he solution of [ownership] questions [involving the railroad grants] depends, of 
course, upon the construction given to the acts making the grants; and they are to 
receive such construction as will carry out the intent of Congress, however difficult 
it might be to give full effect to the language used if the grants were by instruments 
of private conveyance. To ascertain that intent we must look to the condition of the 
country when the acts were passed, as well as to the purpose declared on their face, 
and read all parts of them together. 
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Winona & St. Peter R.R. Co. v. Barney, 113 U.S. 618, 625 (1885)).
 161 Id. at 682–83 (quoting United States v. Denver & Rio Grande R.R. Co., 150 U.S. 1, 14 (1893)).
 162 Id. at 683 (quoting Denver & Rio Grande R.R. Co., 150 U.S. at 14). 
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construction of the railroad.163 At the same time, such a huge land giveaway was 
not politically wise. Therefore, in order to compensate for granted land, Congress 
hoped to sell the retained land to individuals for private use.164 Those retained 
lots would have value because they adjoined the railway. They would also have 
value because they adjoined federal land, particularly land that contained a 
reservoir.165 They would also need access across the granted land, in order to get 
to the reservoir. Moreover, Congress could have rightly assumed that common 
law property rules would apply to the grants to the railroads, to fill in the gaps, 
toward the end of achieving the mutual expectations from the land ownership. If 
it were necessary to condemn a right of way, Congress would be giving away land 
and then buying it back from the grantee.166 
 On the second theory—of avoiding uselessness of the property retained—the 
Court stated that “it could not reasonably be maintained that failure to provide 
access to the public at large would render [the public land,] the Seminole 
Reservoir land useless.”167 But one of the primary purposes of a reservoir is use 
 163 Id. at 670–71.
 164 Id. at 672–73.
 165 Id. at 678. Prior to the litigation, private owners were either denying access over their lands 
to the reservoir area or charging fees for access. Id.
 166 Id. at 680.
 167 Id. at 680 n.15. The implied easement theory addressed by Leo Sheep was an easement by 
necessity. Id. at 1083. One district court has considered and rejected the alternative theory of prior 
use, or quasi-easement, when asserted to establish an easement by implication over private land 
once owned by the federal government. United States v. Balliet, 133 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1126–27 
(W.D. Ark. 2001). However, this rejection did not address the applicability of the theory because 
the facts did not establish all the elements. Id. at 1127–28. The main reason the landowner’s claim 
failed was that he was unable to establish that at the time of purchase the putative servient and 
dominant tenements were owned by the same person while owned privately. Id. at 1123. In fact, 
“the only time the two properties had a single owner was when they were held by the United 
States as federal public lands.” Id. at 1127. The court explained that “[a]lthough an easement of 
necessity or by implication may arise when the United States issues a patent for public lands,” the 
plaintiff failed to show that the road over which he sought access existed at the time of severance. 
Id. 1127–28. Recently, the Montana Supreme Court considered claims made by a mining patent 
holder that an easement was created by reservation by reference to government maps. Our Lady of 
the Rockies, Inc. v. Peterson, 181 P. 3d 631 (Mont. 2008). There, the holder of the mining patent 
asserted that an existing road, part paved and part unimproved, was a public road that could be 
used to reach its proposed development on the theory, among other things, that the road was a 
public easement created when the patent was issued to the western claims by express reference to 
a survey map. Id. at 636–37, 651. The district court ruled in favor of the mining patent holder 
stating that “[a]n express easement by reservation arises when the purchaser’s deed refers to a plat 
where the easement is clearly depicted,” where the reference is “sufficient to put the purchaser on 
‘inquiry notice’ that the property is being conveyed pursuant to a particular recorded document.” 
Id. (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted). Here, the westernmost mining claim referred 
to a survey map describing that claim and showing a road, among other things. Id. at 638. The court 
also determined the road was public because at the time the claim was surveyed, it “belonged” to 
the United States and any road traversing federal land was therefore public. Id. Further, the court 
reasoned that at the time the mining claim was patented, the road was the only ingress and egress 
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by the public. The need to access a water source has been the kind of necessity 
sufficient to establish an easement by necessity.168 
 In Leo Sheep, the Court recognized a possible avenue for establishing a right 
to access, that is, based upon long-held custom.169 The Court, citing Buford v. 
Houtz,170 recognized and affirmed a common law implied license that permitted a 
herder to graze his cattle on open, unfenced land.171 In Buford, the plaintiff owned 
some 300,000 acres of formerly federal lands, which were scattered throughout a 
900,000 acre area of federal lands.172 They sought to enjoin the grazing of sheep 
within the larger area on the grounds that grazing on the federal lands would 
necessarily involve a trespass to their unenclosed land.173 The Court pointed 
to the easternmost claim. Id. Finally, the court observed that over the last century various survey 
maps have identified the road as a public road. Id. The Montana Supreme Court reversed the district 
court on two grounds. Id. at 646, 652. First, while the express reservation by reference to a map was 
a valid theory under Montana law, it was only of “recent vintage” and not recognized at the time the 
putative easement was created. Id. at 641. The court nevertheless went on to find that even if the 
theory applied, it would fail because there was no showing of the required clear and unmistakable 
reference of a right of way on a plat or certificate of survey. Id. at 650. And in any case, the theory 
would only operate to establish a private, but not a public road as the plaintiff sought. Id. at 651. 
Second, even under prevailing federal law, the patent holder loses. Id. at 641. It was well-settled that 
references in a deed to a plat that contains “a description of land, the courses, distances, and other 
particulars” are to be “regarded, in ascertaining the true description of the land and the intent of the 
parties, as if they had been expressly enumerated in the deed.” Id. at 642, 641–42 (citing Jefferis 
v. E. Omaha Land Co., 134 U.S. 178, 194–95 (1890)). But it was still necessary for the court 
to determine whether the federal government intended to reserve a public road across the claim. 
In fact, the survey notes, objects, and data on the survey map were for the purpose of aiding the 
identification of the mining claim, and not for establishing rights outside the express language of the 
conveyancing instrument. Id. at 643. The court found persuasive the holding in Leo Sheep, where 
the Supreme Court was unwilling to imply rights-of-way that would have a substantial impact on 
property rights granted over 100 years ago. Id. at 642 (citing Leo Sheep Co., 440 U.S. at 682). Using 
the same rule of construction, the Montana Supreme Court found that while the deed contained 
reservations by the government for ditches and canals, nothing in the language could be read as 
reserving a road, let alone a public road. Id. at 642–43.
 168 See Night Sisters Corp. Inc., v. Hog Island, Inc., 2007 R.I. Super. LEXIS 31 *24 (Super. Ct. 
R.I. February 26, 2007) (access to well); Hansuld v. Lariat Diesel Corp., 245 P.3d 293, 298 (Wyo. 
2010) (easement by implication for waterline); Homes Dev. Co. v. Simmons, 70 N.W.2d 527, 581 
(S.D. 1955) (easement by implication to access irrigation ditch); Smith v. Heissinger, 745 N.E.2d 
666, 671–72 (Ill. Ct. App. 2001) (easement by necessity is not limited to ingress and egress, but 
may also cover access to water); Pickett v. Whipple, 216 A.D.2d 833, 835 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) 
(recognizing applicability of theory of easement by necessity for access to a water source, but failing 
to find requisite necessity); Bear Island Water Ass’n, Inc. v. Brown, 874 P. 2d 528, 536 (Idaho 
1994) (recognizing aptness of theory of necessity for access to a well, but finding facts did not estab- 
lish easement). 
 169 Leo Sheep Co., 440 U.S. at 688 n.24.
 170 Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 332 (1890) (right to cross private land to allow cattle to 
get to public land for grazing).
 171 Leo Sheep Co., 440 U.S. at 688 n.24.
 172 Buford, 133 U.S. at 325–26.
 173 Id. at 324–26.
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out that throughout history, federal lands had played an important role in the 
production of beef by allowing unrestricted grazing and pasturage of cattle.174 
Even lands being improved under the Homestead Acts were subject to the general 
public’s rights to pasturage.175 Also, nearly all the states had fence laws early on, 
which allowed a landowner to protect cultivated lands by fencing out cattle and 
other domestic animals likely to cause damage to crops, but where absent a fence, 
cattle were free to roam.176 The United States had rejected the English rule that 
imposed a duty on herders to keep his herd within his own enclosure under 
penalty of damages for resulting injuries.177 
 While this opinion was a clear affirmation of the right of the public to enjoy 
public lands, it also implied that an abutting landowner must suffer the burdens 
of the public right to access to the public lands. The right of a landowner to 
control access to his land, to be sure, remains an important right to be observed 
by the courts, and will normally control even if it leaves a neighbor with no or 
limited access. This preference for the landowner’s interest in excluding others 
is revealed not only in the reluctance of the law to imply easements, but also in 
the courts’ delineating the scope of easements. Thus, even when an easement is 
expressly created in favor of the government in a grant, it does not always follow 
that a right of access extends to the public.178 This attitude was made plain in Cal-
Neva Land & Timber, Inc. v. United States.179 There, the landowner sought to limit 
BLM access across private land for administrative purposes only and to preclude 
general public access.180 The easement granted by the landowner’s predecessor 
granted a “perpetual easement and right-of-way, including but not limited to the 
right and privilege to locate, construct, relocate, maintain, control, and repair a 
roadway . . . .”181 The BLM agent who negotiated the easement testified that the 
purposes of the easement were to gain access to BLM timber and the management 
of BLM lands.182 The testimony further showed that from the time of the grant 
in 1957 to 1981, any gates on the land covered by the easement were unlocked, 
which meant regular access by the public.183 In 1981, the new manager of the 
 174 Id. at 326–27. 
 175 Id. at 327.
 176 Id. at 328, 330.
 177 Id. at 331.
 178 See, e.g., Cal-Neva Land & Timber Inc. v. United States, 70 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (D. 
Oregon 1999).
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. at 1154–56. 
 181 Id. at 1155–56.
 182 Id. at 1155. There were certain reservations in the grant including the requirement to 
pay for transporting logs, approve the location of new roads, and the requirement to repair of any 
damage to irrigation ditches, fences, and gates. Id. at 1156.
 183 Id. at 1156.
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ranch over which the easement passed posted no trespassing signs and then began 
blocking the main gate, at first during hunting seasons, and then at all times.184 
When the manager refused to remove the lock in response to the BLM’s demand, 
the BLM cited the manager for locking the gate.185 This dispute led to a quiet title 
action. The court’s analysis focused on the scope of the easement.186 It explained 
that “[o]rdinarily, an easement passes no rights to the grantee except those that 
are necessary for the easement’s reasonable and proper enjoyment.”187 However, 
the easement owner’s rights to use and enjoyment are limited only by express and 
unequivocal restrictions or reservations appearing in the written document or 
by extrinsic evidence demonstrating an intent by the original parties to the limit 
the easement rights.188 When an easement’s scope is not specifically defined, “the 
rule is that it need be only such as is reasonably necessary and convenient for the 
purposes for which it was created.”189 This means that “an easement granted in 
general and in unlimited terms,” will be deemed to give unrestricted reasonable 
use and no specification of every allowable use within this conception is necessary 
to confer these rights.190 
 Applying these principles, in order to ascertain any such restrictions or 
limitations, the court first looked to the plain language of the granting instrument 
viewed in the context of the entire document,191 then looked to determine 
whether there was any ambiguity which could be resolved by an examination 
of the circumstances surrounding the grant.192 The court determined that while 
the easement did not mention the public, it unambiguously gave the BLM the 
right to allow public access.193 This was because the express language granted 
the BLM a “‘perpetual easement and right-of-way, including but not limited 
to the right and privilege to locate, construct, relocate, maintain, control, and 
repair a roadway’ over and across their real property.”194 This “including but 
not limited to” language meant the purposes were expressly unlimited.195 With 
 184 Id.
 185 Id.
 186 Id. at 1157–63.
 187 Id. at 1157 (quoting Watson v. Banducci, 973 P.2d 395, 400 (Or. 1999) (citing Miller v. 
Vaughn, 1880 WL 1543 at *3 (Or. 1880))).
 188 Id. (quoting Watson, 973 P.2d at 400 (citing Jones v. Edwards, 347 P.2d 846, 848 (Or. 
1959); Kell v. Oppenlander, 961 P.2d 861, 863–64 (Or. 1998))).
 189 Id. (quoting Fendall, v. Miller, 196 P. 381, 383 (Or. 1921)).
 190 Id. at 1158 (quoting Criterion Interests, Inc. v. Deschutes Club, 902 P.2d 110, 113, 
modified 903 P.2d 421 (1995)).
 191 Id. at 1157 (citations omitted).
 192 Id. (citations omitted).
 193 Id. at 1158. 
 194 Id.
 195 Id. 
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“unlimited purposes come unlimited uses,” especially where there were no express 
restrictions on the easement’s use.196 While “logging” was expressly mentioned as 
an authorized use for the easement, the court found that nothing suggested that 
that use was intended to be an exclusive use.197 Moreover, the word ”control” 
meant “the BLM [had] the right to regulate, govern, administer, and oversee the 
road after it [had] been located and constructed.”198 This interpretation of the 
language of the easement, however, did not end the inquiry into the scope of 
the easement. Instead, the government had to establish that the terms “licensees” 
and “permittees,” as referenced in the granting instrument, were intended to 
include the public.199 The instrument itself did not define these terms, but the 
language was found to be broad enough to include recreationists.200 Nothing in 
the language or history of the parties’ negotiations limited licensees to persons 
engaging in particular activities, such as harvesting timber or grazing.201 Nor did 
the absence of language describing the permissible uses of the easement create 
an ambiguity.202 Instead, the easement scope was broad enough to be used for all 
reasonable purposes.203 
 While the rights of the public to cross in Cal-Neva Land & Timber were 
established by the interpretation of an express easement, the case nonetheless 
shows that such rights cannot be assumed, although rights over or in another’s 
land can be defined by reference to acts upon the land.204
 196 Id.
 197 Id. at 1161. 
 198 Id. at 1158. 
 199 Id. at 1159.
 200 Id. at 1159 (“describing historical use by general public of the United States’ public domain 
for recreation and other purposes as access under implied license”) (citing United States v. Curtis-
Nevada Mines, Inc., 611 F.2d 1277, 1283 (9th Cir. 1980)). 
 201 Id. at 1158–59.
 202 Id. at 1161.
 203 Id. at 1159. 
 204 Having concluded the terms of the grant were not ambiguous, and therefore extrinsic 
evidence was not admissible, out of caution, to avoid a remand where the parties would have to 
resubmit evidence, the court went on to consider extrinsic evidence bearing on intent. Id. at 1161. 
The parties presented no evidence of specific discussions of the public use of the easement during 
negotiations, but the BLM agent testified “it was common knowledge at the time that BLM-
constructed or controlled roads were open to the public, and that the easements could be used for a 
variety of purposes.” Id. Other evidence was conflicting as to whether permission was required for 
use of the roadway. Id. at 1161–63 (while some asked, others did not, in either case there were never 
any locked gates). And the permission usually sought was not to use the roadway to access public 
lands, but to hunt or recreate on private lands. Id. From this, the court concluded that at the time 
the easement was granted, the roadway was burdened with public use. This indicated an intent that 
public uses would continue. Id. at 1163. The court found evidence of conduct by the landowners, 
BLM, and others, after the grant, not helpful. Id. Indeed, if the landowners blocked access, it would 
only mean that they engaged in conduct in violation of the BLM’s rights. Id.
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D. The Right to Fence Out Never Inhered in the Title
 Perhaps the most fundamental reason for finding public access over private land 
to reach public lands is the proposition that the right to exclude the public never 
inhered in the title to land that stands as a gateway to public resources. This proposition 
is consistent with the Supreme Court’s oft-stated aphorism that “[p]roperty 
interests . . . are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and 
their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from 
an independent source such as state law.”205 Most recently on a regulatory takings 
claim, Justice Scalia, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,206 restated this 
long-held view.207 In large measure, the common law is about property ownership. 
Some of the earliest concerns of society had to do with securing individuals rights 
in land. “[F]reedom, and the security of private property were linked together as 
the ancient liberties of the free English subject.”208 Laws arose in the community 
to protect these liberties.209 It is the protection of property that encourages owners 
to invest in order to accumulate more, which in turn, enables forward thought, 
invention, and ultimately artistic and leisurely pursuits, after the base human 
needs have been provided for.210
 205 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980)); see also Hughes v. 
Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 295 (1967) (“[A]s a general proposition[,] the law of real property is, 
under our Constitution, left to the individual States to develop and administer.”) (internal quotation 
omitted); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992); Texaco v. Short 
454 U.S. 516, 525 (1982); United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 115–16 (1985).
 206 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
 207 Id. at 1030 (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
 208 William H. Taft, The Right of Private Property, 3 mich. L. J. 215, 215 (1894). 
 209 Indeed, “[a] government which recognized no such rights, which held the lives, liberty and 
property of its citizens, subject at all times to the absolute disposition and unlimited control of even 
the most democratic depository of power is, after all, a despotism.” Id. at 233.
 210 See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 am. econ. Rev. 347, 347–59 
(1967) (asserting that private property facilitates efficiency and utility by the internalization of 
externalities); JeRemy WaLdRon, the Right to pRivate pRopeRty 251, 353 (1988) (concluding 
that the concept of property allows individuals to keep what they acquire; that private property 
is necessary to sustain and develop the “abilities and self-conception definitive of . . . status 
as persons”).
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1. The Common Law as Evolving and Fluid: Responses to Externalities
 A large part of the common law was formed by the rules that developed 
to protect private property. But what is the common law?211 “As a body of 
rules and concepts, it cannot be dated much earlier than the first half of the 
twelfth century.”212 
 A.W.B. Simpson, the highly regarded chronicler of the English common law, 
once noted that if the common law’s existence is thought of in terms of a set of 
rules, “it is in general the case that one cannot say what the common law is.”213 
“As a system of legal thought the common law . . . is inherently incomplete, vague 
and fluid.”214 Professor Simpson wrote: 
The ideas and practices which comprise the common law are 
customary . . . in that their status is thought to be dependent 
upon conformity with the past, and they are traditional in the 
sense that they are transmitted through time as a received body 
of knowledge and learning . . . . Such rules . . . serve . . . as 
guides to proper practice, since the proper practice is in part the  
normal practice . . . . 
215
 211 RogeR cotteRReLL, the poLiticS oF JuRiSpRudence: a cRiticaL intRoduction to 
LegaL phiLoSophy 23–25 (Pa. Press 1989). Perhaps the greatest monument to the common law is 
Blackstone’s Commentaries, written “in part as an extended essay celebrating the genius and liberty 
of the English people and demonstrating how English common law exemplified ‘the general spirit of 
laws to principles of universal jurisprudence.’” Wayne moRRiSon, BLacKStone’S commentaRieS on 
the LaWS oF engLand xii (Wayne Morrison ed., Cavenish Publishing Limited, 2001). Blackstone’s 
guiding notion was that custom and tradition of the past would provide a template for resolving 
problems over time. Id. at iv, xiv–xvi, lv–lvi, 12, 47–52. Many writers since have rejected this 
premise, arguing that modernity should apply rules and principles of current times which are 
more relevant to the current issues. E.g., JüRgen haBeRmaS, the phiLoSophicaL diScouRSe oF 
modeRnity 7 (Frederick G. Lawrence trans., MIT Press 1987). Perhaps, Blackstone’s greatest 
critic was Jeremy Bentham, who accused him, among other things, of offering ideas that masked 
rational jurisprudence in favor of adherence to past notions. See JeRemy Bentham, A Fragment on 
Government, in a comment on the commentaRieS and a FRagment on goveRnment 391–98 
(J. H. Burns & H. L. A. Hart eds., 1977). 
 212 2 WiLLiam SeaRLe hoLdSWoRth, a hiStoRy oF engLiSh LaW 2-1 (Vol. 2 1909). There 
were, to be sure, well-defined rules and customs that governed the lives of the Anglo-Saxons in the 
six centuries before the Conquest. Id. at 2–106. These laws and customs governed a person’s status 
in society, criminal acts, property, and family law. Id. at 2-15; 2-25-2-106.
 213 Brian Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in LegaL theoRy and common LaW 
8, 16 (William Twining ed., 1986).
 214 Id. at 17.
 215 Id. at 20–21.
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 The common law is viewed as embodying an ancient wisdom, which may 
be timeless, but is continually evolving through collective experience.216 This 
seems to set up a sort of conundrum—common law thought embracing complex 
notions, explaining and justifying past practices, and providing guidance for 
future conduct. At the same time, common law thought allows the development 
of new doctrines and ideas, so it has a dynamism which custom may lack.217 
 At first the common law of property aimed to secure possession. Other inter-
ests emerged including establishing right, succession, and alienation. Consequently, 
the set of rules that comprise the common law is not precise and finite.
218
 
“[T]he heart of [property law]” is “not in specific decisions or rules.” Instead, it is 
the “broad notions which are difficult to unify or systematise, but which [are yet] 
‘woven into the fabric of life.’”
219
 It is the uncertainty of law that endows it with its 
intrinsic virtue, contributing to its stability. Indeterminacy also makes it possible 
for the law to remain stable while adapting to changing circumstances by making 
a new interpretation of the words. Because the words are not repudiated, the rule 
stands; continuity is preserved; innovation is introduced.220 
 Property has long-since lost its all or nothing conception. Instead, it has evolved 
into a law of accommodation—evolving with societal needs and efficiency.221 
 216 Simpson, supra note 213, at 20. The “common law is a system of customary law . . . as it 
consists of a body of practices observed and ideas received over time by a caste of lawyers, these ideas 
being used by them as providing guidance . . . .”
 217 cotteRReLL, supra note 211, at 28.
 218 cotteRReLL, supra note 211, at 23. Yet, in Leo Sheep v. United States, the Court was 
reluctant both “as a matter of common-law doctrine and as a matter of construing congressional 
intent, . . . to imply rights-of-way, with the substantial impact that such implication would have on 
property rights granted over 100 years ago, in the absence of a stronger case for their implication” 
from the Government. 440 U.S. 668, 680–82 (1979).
 219 cotteRReLL, supra note 211, at 24.
 220 ShiRLey R. LetWin, on the hiStoRy oF the idea oF LaW 337–38 (Noel B. Reynolds ed., 
2005). This indeterminacy of law was the main target of the Realist movement. Id. at 337–38. The 
authors asserted that because law is not discovered in Nature, or revealed by God, or imprinted in 
human reason, it cannot be objective. Id. at 338. Rather, it is solely the product of the individual 
judges’ beliefs, prejudices, and inclinations. Id. It is thus arbitrary. The retort to this assertion is that 
even though a resolution of a dispute is not susceptible to resolution as a mathematical problem, it is 
yet not necessarily irrational or subjective. It is possible to refer to statutes, decisions, and procedures 
to find reasons in a decision, even though one might come to a different resolution.
 221 In marking out the contours of intellectual property rights, courts typically look to property 
law generally for analogies. See, e.g., Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60–61 
(1884) (defining authorship as individual creation); Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1541–43 
(7th Cir. 1990) (demarcating private rights from that in public domain). Perhaps, in this instance, 
the converse may be true. The copyright statute begins by declaring that an author shall have certain 
exclusive rights (to copy, distribute, make derivative works, perform, and display publicly), all of 
which, however, are subject to the fair use provisions. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106–07 (2012). While the 
current fair use provisions are codified in the statute, until the 1976 enactment of the current 
statute, fair use was premised on the notion of implied consent by the author and measured by a 
rule of reason. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 550–60 (1985); 
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The current conception of property is one that reflects the recognition “that 
property is not a natural right, but a deliberate construction by society.”222 There 
are necessary limits on the power that property confers, largely as a consequence 
of the imposition of stewardship responsibilities on ownership. The New Jersey 
Supreme Court in State v. Shack eloquently expressed this view.223 The court 
pointed out that “a man’s right [to] his real property . . . is not absolute, [it is] a 
maxim of the common law that one should . . . use his property” in a way that 
does not “injure the rights of others.”224 This maxim expresses “the inevitable 
proposition that rights are relative . . . and must be [accommodating] when they 
meet.”225 The court went on to note that, “it has long been true that necessity, 
private or public, may justify entry upon the lands of another.”226 The court 
further noted, “[W]hile society will protect the owner in his permissible interests 
in land, yet ‘[s]uch an owner must expect to find the absoluteness of his property 
rights curtailed by the organs of society, for the promotion of the best interests 
of others for whom these organs also operate as protective agencies.’”227 In sum, 
property “serves human values [and is] recognized to that end.”228 
 The ruling in Shack does not fit within classical liberal contractarianism. 
Farmer did not consent to allow the service workers to enter. And, under Shack’s 
principles, the utility of the result can be questioned—the workers who depend 
upon the landowner for their very being are not likely to complain too much 
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). Another could make limited use 
of copyrighted work for the purposes for which the work was created—that is, to edify, delight. 
However, wholesale appropriation was not permitted. Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 342. Fair use was one of 
those compromises, it seems, necessary to justify the monopoly that the act conferred upon authors 
consistent with the purposes of protecting intellectual property to start with—to benefit society in 
some way. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 557–59. The analogy is apt to a point, and 
perhaps ends at the idea that the right to exclude inhering in physical property is demanded by 
the finite characteristics of the property. There is a real concern with dissipation and exhaustion, 
whereas, with intellectual creations, the monopoly is not necessary to guard against exhaustion, 
but to enable financial rewards to facilitate more creations. See id. (“[E]ncouragement of individual 
effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and 
inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’”) (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)). 
 222 Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 yaLe L.J. 733, 771 (1964).
 223 New Jersey v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971). Defendants, a field worker, and a 
staff attorney from a non-profit corporation formed to provide health services, legal advice, and 
representation for migrant workers, were convicted of violating a trespass statute when they entered 
private farming property to meet with the migrant workers in the privacy of their living quarters 
without the farmer-employer’s permission or supervision. Id. at 277–301. The Supreme Court of 
New Jersey held that defendants did not invade the “possessory right of the farmer-employer.” Id. at 
375. The defendants’ conduct therefore was “beyond the reach of the trespass statute.” Id. 
 224 Shack, 277 A.2d at 373.
 225 Id.
 226 Id.
 227 Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
 228 Id. at 372.
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about conditions, especially while on the other’s land. The economy of the result 
is not well-established as it might allow interferences with the productive activities 
occurring on the land. Nevertheless, the result does fit within an evolving 
conception of property as having regard for a spectrum of values and limits as it 
relates to those affected by the right to exclude; it recognizes the absence of true 
choice, i.e., whether to venture off the farm for services and possibly compromise 
the position or suffer without them, the position intact. It seems that property 
rights should not be measured solely and irreversibly “on the basis of [the] initial 
allocation or recognition of entitlements and obligations, but also” on competing 
interests when enforcement of those rights is required.229
 Other writers seem to share the view of the New Jersey Supreme Court. 
Cohen states:
[W]e can no longer maintain Montesquieu’s view that private 
property is sacrosanct and that the general government must 
in no way interfere with or retrench its domain . . . . To be 
really effective . . . , the right of property must be supported by 
restrictions or positive duties on the part of owners, enforced 
by the state as much as the right to exclude others which is the 
essence of property . . . [I]f the large property owner is viewed, as 
he ought to be, as a wielder of power over the lives of his fellow 
citizens, the law should not hesitate to develop a doctrine as to 
his positive duties in the public interest.230
C.B. MacPherson had a similar view asserting, “[T]he right to exclude is no more 
the essence of property—as a matter of logic or as a matter of propriety—than the 
right not to be excluded . . . .”231 When framed in this context, the issue is no longer 
“putting limits on the property right, but of supplementing the individual right 
to exclude others by the individual right not to be excluded by others . . . . This 
latter right . . . may provisionally be stated as the individual right to equal access 
to the means of labour and/or the means of life.”232 
 229 See Amnon Lehavi, How Property Can Create, Maintain, Or Destroy Community, 10 
theoReticaL inq. L. 4, 62–63 (2009) (discussing “property law is measured not only on the 
basis of initial allocation or recognition of entitlements and obligations, but also on the ongoing 
enforcement of such interests by the legal system,” which diverges based “on the type of resource, 
the nature of the alleged infringement and competing interests”).
 230 Morris R. Cohen, supra note 18, at 21, 26.
 231 C.B. MacPherson, Liberal-Democracy and Property, in pRopeRty: mainStReam and cRiticaL 
poSitionS 199, (C.B. MacPherson ed., 1978) (emphasis added). 
 232 Id. at 201. Richard Epstein has taken a radically different view in favor of absolute rights 
providing the basis for later market transactions: so long as there are enough buyers and sellers, 
market forces will check abuse. Richard A. Epstein, Book Note, Rights and “Rights Talk”, 105 haRv. 
L. Rev. 1106, 1109 (1992).
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 By rejecting the all or nothing monolithic conception, property law serves 
human ends by moving away from enforcement or no enforcement and instead 
seeking to resolve conflicting interests by accommodation. This is the way courts 
are now conceiving and addressing issues involving non-possessory rights in land. 
Under this dynamic approach, an express easement holder may be allowed to 
change the scope of an easement if the easement will retain its utility, but not 
unduly burden the servient owner. A permitted change/expansion necessarily 
curtails the servient owner’s right to exclude while broadening the easement holder’s 
available access. One could argue that the servient owner, having voluntarily given 
an easement, does surrender some power. In the context of the issues in this paper, 
while no landowner has voluntarily entered into such a relationship, this is usually 
the case where the easement may be implied by law. Just as a landowner selling 
land that needs access over the retained land should anticipate use by the owner of 
that sold land, which right the law finds by implication, so should one purchasing 
land that stands as a gateway to natural areas. The parallel is exact.
2. The Landowner’s Title is Burdened by the Public Trust Doctrine
 If the public trust doctrine applied to burden the public lands while 
under government ownership, by operation of that doctrine, either the lands 
could not be alienated or the burdens of the trust would continue even after 
severance of a parcel to private owners. The earliest conception of the public 
trust doctrine pertained to waters, in particular, tidal waters.233 All rivers and 
ports were public, and the right of fishing was common to all, which meant that 
“the state’s sovereignty extended over the foreshore, [which] was considered the 
people’s common property, of which the state was merely trustee.” 234 As such, the 
government was constrained to “exercise its sovereign powers only in a regulatory 
capacity,” that is, to ensure use in common.235 
 233 See generally the inStituteS oF JuStinian With engLiSh intRoduction, tRanSLation, and 
noteS 90–92 (Thomas C. Sandars trans., 1922) (“The sea-shore, that is, the shore as far as the waves 
go at furthest was considered to belong to all men . . . . The public use of the sea-shore, too, is part of 
the law of nations, as is that of the sea itself . . . .”). Emperor Justinian in 533 A.D. codified, under 
Roman Law, natural law communal rights in certain basic and omnipresent natural resources. Id. 
at 1–2, 90–91; see also The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Submerged Traditional Doctrine, 
79 yaLe L.J. 762, 763–64 (1970). By natural law, these things—air, running water, sea, shores, 
are the common property of all. the inStituteS oF JuStinian With engLiSh intRoduction, 
tRanSLation, and noteS, supra note 233, at 90. For a discussion suggesting even earlier origins of 
the concept see Charles F. Wilkinson, Symposium on the Public Trust and the Waters of the American 
West: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow: Introduction and Overview: The Headwaters of the Public Trust: 
Some Thoughts on the Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 envtL. L. 425, 428–30 (1989).
 234 Heather J. Wilson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Massachusetts Land Law, 11 B.c. envtL.
aFF.L.Rev. 839, 842–43 (1984); the inStituteS oF JuStinian With engLiSh intRoduction, 
tRanSLation, and noteS, supra note 233, at 91. “Foreshore” refers to that part of a shore that lies 
between the highest and lowest watermark. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dept. of 
Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2598 (2010).
 235 Wilson, supra note 234, at 842–43.
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 The concept took on a slightly different expression under English common 
law. It was generally held that the shore and tidal lands were held in trust by the 
King for the citizenry to guarantee the free exercise of commerce, navigation, 
and fishing.236 The common law distinguished between jus privatum, property 
and/or land which the King could transfer to individuals in fee ownership and 
the jus publicum, the right vested in the King to hold such property as the sea, 
submerged land, rivers, and land below the high water mark for the benefit of the 
public.237 Jus privatum applied to land not affected by the tide.238 Jus publicum 
applied to submerged land under navigable waters, which was narrowly defined 
to mean those waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tides.239 Absent a grant 
to the contrary, the riparian owner held title to the submerged land to the thread 
of the current, or centerline, of the river or lake to which the land abutted.240 
However, all waters, whether tidal or not, were subject to a general public right 
of use for navigation and fishing.241 This meant that neither the King nor the 
private riparian owner could use ownership to obstruct or deny free navigation to 
the public.242 
 236 Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842); United States v. 1.58 Acres 
of Land Situated in the City of Boston, Cnty. of Suffolk, Commonwealth of Mass., 523 F. Supp. 
120 (D. Mass. 1981) (“[N]either the federal government nor the state may convey land below the 
low water mark to private individuals free of the sovereign jus publicum.”).
 237 Eva H. Morreale, Federal Power in Western Waters: The Navigation Power and the Rule of No 
Compensation, 3 nat. ReSouRceS J. 1, 26 (1963).
 238 See generally JoSeph K. angeLL, a tReatiSe on the common LaW in ReLation to WateR-
couRSeS: intended moRe paRticuLaRLy aS an iLLuStRation oF the RightS and dutieS oF the 
oWneRS and occupantS oF WateR pRiviLegeS: to Which iS added an appendix, containing the 
pRincipaL adJudged caSeS 17 (1824) (“[T]he uniform mode of ascertaining [navigability], as well 
in this country as in England, (with one exception in the state of Pennsylvania) has been by the 
flowing of the tide.”).
 239 Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11 (1894) (“By the common law . . . where the tide ebbs 
and flows, and of all the lands below high-water mark, within the jurisdiction of the crown of 
England, are in the king . . . . Therefore the title, jus privatum, in such lands, as of waste and 
unoccupied lands, belongs to the king, as the sovereign; and the dominion thereof, jus publicum, is 
vested in him, as the representative of the nation and for the public benefit.”); see also JameS Kent, 
3 commentaRieS on ameRican LaW 344 (1828) (concept of navigability linked to fact of tidal 
waters); Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 317–18 (1987), overruled on other grounds by 
Or. ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand and Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 370–72 (1977).
 240 angeLL, supra note 238, at 17.
 241 Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. at 13.
 242 The concept came to be expressed in the Magna Carta. See Magna Carta, ch. 13 (1215), 
reprinted in J.c. hoLt, magna caRta app. at 455 (2d ed. 1992) (private ownership limited to 
the foreshore); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 389 (1842) (noting that Magna Carta 
constrained King’s power to grant rights to navigable waters); Weston v. Sampson, 62 Mass. 347, 
352 (1851) (noting that Magna Carta constrained King’s power to grant exclusive fishing rights).
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 However, the American conception of the reach of the public trust diverged 
from this early English conception.243 It extended to non-tidal lands to the extent 
they were navigable.244 In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court 
ruled that the public trust even covered tidal waters that were not navigable.245 
This is because the state’s interest in such waters, such as for bathing, swimming, 
recreation, fishing, and mineral development, are not related to navigability.246 
“Limiting the public trust doctrine to only tidelands under navigable waters 
might well result in a loss to the public of some of these traditional privileges.”247 
The Court also found that the burdens of the public trust doctrine passed to the 
states as they were admitted to the union.248 
 As it is generally conceived, under the public trust doctrine, waters that are 
navigable are not susceptible to the ordinary rights of private ownership, but are 
reserved to achieve the larger interests in public navigation and commerce.249 
Similarly, the use of the banks of rivers is also free, such that all persons are at 
liberty to land their vessels and to tie up on the banks or unload cargo. All persons 
have the freedom to use the seashore to the highest tide line. The fundamental 
aim remained clear—providing access.
 One of the earliest expressions of the American concept of public trust 
doctrine came in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois 250 where the court ruled 
 243 Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 286 (1997) (citing John m. gouLd, 
a tReatiSe on the LaW oF WateRS, incLuding RipaRian RightS, and puBLic and pRivate RightS 
in WateRS tidaL and inLand §32 (2d ed. 1891)). “[T]hese developments in American law [were] 
a natural outgrowth of the perceived public character of submerged land[], a perception which 
[informed] the principle that these lands were tied in a unique way to sovereignty.” Coeur d’Alene 
Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. at 286. American law did not embrace jus privatum, thereby avoiding 
recognition of the sovereignty’s right “to seize private structures on shores and marshes reclaimed 
from tidewaters.” Id. at 286 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
 244 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 479 (1988) (discussing Barney v. 
Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 (1877)); The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 
443, 454 (1851).
 245 Phillips Petroleum Co, 484 U.S. at 479–85 (discussing that the test for determining reach of 
public trust doctrine is tidal versus non-tidal lands as opposed to navigable versus non-navigable).
 246 Id. at 482.
 247 Id. at 483 n.12.
 248 Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193 (1987); Bonelli Cattle Co. v. 
Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973); Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 317–18 (1987), 
overruled on other grounds by Or. ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand and Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 
363 (1977); Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410, 417 (1842) (recognizing that 
New Jersey, and each of the original thirteen states, gained “absolute right to all their navigable 
waters, and the soils under them for their common use” and the people have a common right to fish 
for shell fish and floating fish). 
 249 Bonelli Cattle Co., 414 U.S. at 322 (citation omitted); 101 Ranch v. United States, 905 F.2d 
180, 182–83 (8th Cir. 1990).
 250 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
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that the public trust doctrine was not limited to the navigable seas, as under 
English law, but applies to any navigable water. Additionally, the Court found that 
“[t]he [public trust] doctrine [was] founded upon the necessity of preserving to the 
public the use of navigable waters from private interruption and encroachment, a 
reason as applicable to navigable fresh waters as to waters moved by the tide.”251 
In this respect, the public trust doctrine operated much like a public easement.252
 The Court ruled that the state grant, whereby it ceded all control over the 
land, could not be sustained because the state held such land in trust for the 
public and the public trust responsibility could not be relinquished by a transfer 
of the property. The state regulatory authority can never be lost.253 According to 
the Court, the State could “no more abdicate its trust responsibility in managing 
property,” . . . except in the limited instances for improvement of navigation 
and when transfers do not impair the public interest in the resource retained, 
any more than it “c[ould] abdicate its police powers in the administration of 
government and the preservation of the peace.”254 The trust responsibility with 
which navigable waterways are held, therefore, was governmental and could not 
generally be alienated.255 
 Thus, the Supreme Court extended the public trust doctrine to cover 
submerged land under navigable inland waterways not subject to the ebb and flow 
 251 Illinois Cent. R.Co., 146 U.S. at 436. Suit was commenced by the Attorney General of 
Illinois for a declaration of title to certain lands on the east, or lake front, of the city of Chicago. 
Id. at 433. The land was situated between the Chicago River and Sixteenth Street, which had been 
reclaimed from the waters of the lake. Id. The area had been used for the usual structures and 
apparatus employed in a railroad business, including tracks, piers and submerged lands running for 
a mile, from the south pier near the Chicago river. Id. at 433–34. The Illinois Railroad maintained 
it had title based on a grant from the State and a city ordinance conveying the bed of Lake Michigan, 
lying east of the tracks and breakwaters of the company. Id. at 438. The grant and ordinance also 
conveyed the right to construct in the harbor such wharves as it needed for its operations. Id. The 
grant from the state was based on a grant from Congress in 1850 to the State of Illinois, a right 
of way, one hundred feet in width for its length for the construction of a railroad. Id. at 439. The 
Railroad constructed tracks on a 200 foot tract, reclaimed from the waters of the Lake to enable 
entry into the city. Id. at 469–70. The Court began with the recitation of the 
settled law that . . . ownership of and dominion and sovereignty over lands covered 
by tide waters, within the limits of the several states, belong to the respective states 
within which they are found, with the consequent right to use or dispose of any 
portion thereof, when that can be done without substantial impairment of the interest 
of the public in the waters, and subject always to the paramount right of [C]ongress to 
control the navigation so far as may be necessary for the regulation of commerce with 
foreign nations and among the states.
Id. at 435. 
 252 Michael C. Blumm, Public Property and the Democratization of Western Water Law: 
A Modern View of the Public Trust Doctrine, 19 envtL. L. 573, 580–84 (1989).
 253 See Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 452–53.
 254 Id.
 255 Id. at 455–56.
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of the tide.256 This extension was based on the observation that the original rule was 
founded on the need for public use of navigable waterways, but due to particular 
factual settings, England equated “tide waters” with “navigable waters.”257 Here, 
in the United States, there were tens of thousands of miles of navigable waterways 
not subject to the tide. Yet, because they were essential to interstate travel, it 
was equally necessary to extend the underlying doctrine—that is, to ensure 
the accomplishment of the important public values in free movement and to 
facilitate commerce.258 
a. The Public Trust Doctrine as Part of Evolving  
Common Law
 Professor Robin Craig, in her latest work on the public trust doctrine, urges 
us to conceive of the public trust as any other common law principle—one that 
expands and adjusts in response to an evolving and changing society.259 In this 
conception, the public trust doctrine embraces both public rights in and public 
values of natural resources and is no longer limited to using water for navigation, 
commerce, and fishing, but instead is extended to facilitate public enjoyment, 
preservation and conservation of a host of natural resources.260 Professor Craig 
states that “[l]ike any other category of state common law . . . , state public 
trust doctrines both reflect historic concerns and public policies—specifically, the 
particular public concerns regarding water in particular locations of the United 
States—and provide the states with an ‘ability to adapt to emerging societal 
needs.’”261 While state courts “have celebrated the flexible and evolutionary nature 
of their public trust doctrines, . . . scholars have been reluctant to embrace the rich 
mixture of approaches to balancing public and private rights in water and other 
natural resources that [have] emerged” in precedent.262 Professor Craig explains 
that the western states’ greater flexibility in approaches to the recognition (or 
not) of public rights in, and the public values of, water and other aspects of the 
environment can be explained by four factors: 
 256 Id. at 435–37; see also Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 (1876). 
 257 Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 435–36.
 258 Id. at 436–37.
 259 Robin K. Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust Doctrines: Public 
Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public Trust, 37 ecoLogy L.q. 
53 (2010).
 260 Id. at 92. She traces the development of the doctrine over the centuries and across 
the states.
 261 Id. at 91 (citing Mary C. Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard 
the Environment for Present and Future Generations (Part I): Ecological Realism and the Need for a 
Paradigm Shift, 39 envtL. L. 43, 78 (2009)).
 262 Id. at 91. 
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[1)] the severing of water rights from real property ownership 
and the riparian rights doctrine[, thereby freeing them] 
from one set of potentially confining private property rights 
[; 2)] subsequent state declarations of public ownership of 
fresh water[,] . . . [thereby allowing] public trust doctrines to 
operate independently of state title to submerged lands and 
federal pronouncements regarding ‘the’ public trust doctrine 
[; 3)] perceptions of shortages of fresh water, submerged lands, 
and environmental amenities[, prompting] increased interest, 
compared to the East, in preserving the public values in these 
resources[; and 4)] the willingness of most western states to raise 
water and other environmental issues to constitutional status 
and/or to incorporate broad public trust mandates into statutes 
[thereby encouraging the evolution of ] water-based public trust 
principles into expanding ecological public trust doctrines.263
She concludes, true to a common law fashion, state courts are using state public 
trust doctrine to respond to particular and emerging state needs—the loss of 
native species, protecting coastal waters, and responding to “climate-change 
driven appearance of new publicly usable water resources.” Craig explains:
While such evolutions and expansions complicate the identity—
indeed, the very existence—of any unitary, national, perhaps 
Constitution-based public trust doctrine, they also provide 
place-based balancing of public and private needs and values 
in that most basic of natural resources—fresh water—that may 
better serve the long-term interests of the nation as a whole.264
 The concept of public trust is now interpreted to encompass a broad range 
of interests affecting the public interest in lands—to include the right to portage 
on private land around stream barriers265 and public access rights to tidelands 
and shorelands.266 The doctrine has been extended to protect wildlife267 and rural 
 263 Id. at 92.
 264 Id.
 265 Mont. Coal. for Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P. 2d 163 (Mont. 1984); Mont. Coal. for 
Stream Access v. Hildreth, 684 P. 2d 1088, 1092 (Mont. 1984) (determining that title to underlying 
streambed is immaterial to determining navigability for recreational use), overruled on other grounds 
by Gray v. Billings, 689 P.2d 268 (Mont. 1984).
 266 CWC Fisheries, Inc. v. Bunker, 755 P.2d 1115, 1121 (Alaska 1988) (finding ownership of 
tidelands is subject to fishing rights in the public); City of Berkeley v. Superior Court of Alameda 
Cnty., 26 Cal. 3d 515, 534 (1980) (grants of tideland subject to rights under public trust); Marks 
v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 260 (1971) (en banc) (same); Idaho Forest Indus. v. Hayden Lake 
Watershed Improvement Dist., 733 P. 2d 733, 737 (1987) (finding public trust renders public 
uses indestructible).
 267 Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896), overruled on other grounds by Hughes v. 
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979). The Supreme Court affirmed that extension, pointing out that 
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parklands.268 At first, it was limited to protecting the wet sand of a beach, but 
now it has been expanded to cover the dry sand.269 It was extended in California 
to inland from the shore.270 Other states have broadened the public trust concept 
to include a wide range of activities,271 for purposes other than the facilitation 
of commerce or food production, including: recreation, canoeing, bathing, and 
aesthetic values, as a spiritual retreat.272 Other courts, while recognizing the right 
of the public for access to the shores, stopped short of recognizing a right to 
recreate thereon.273 
at common law, wild animals, “having no owner, were considered as belonging in common to all 
citizens of a state.” Id. at 522. The Court further stated:
While the fundamental principles upon which the common property in game rest 
have undergone no change, the development of free institutions had led to the 
recognition of the fact that the power or control lodged in the state, resulting from 
this common ownership, is to be exercised, like all other powers of government, as a 
trust for the benefit of the people, and not as a prerogative for the advantage of the 
government as distinct from the people, or for the benefit of private individuals as 
distinguished from the public good.
Id. at 529. See also Wade v. Kramer, 459 N.E.2d 1025, 1027–29 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (recognizing 
that while wildlife are protected by the Illinois public trust, the legislature has the authority to 
reallocate public trust property to different uses in the public interest); Kelly v. 1250 Oceanside 
Partners, 140 P.3d 985, 1003 (Haw. 2006).
 268 Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm’n, 215 N.E.2d 114, 120–21 (Mass. 1966); Friend 
of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York, 750 N.E.2d 1050, 1053 (2001).
 269 See Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 393 A.2d 571, 574 (N.J. 1978) (holding that dry beach 
is subject to the public trust doctrine, even though the area has been leveled and graded to create the 
beach by a private owner).
 270 California v. Superior Court of Lake Cnty., 625 P.2d 239, 252 (Cal. 1981) (holding that 
riparian owner of land along navigable non-tidal water held title to land between the high and low 
water marks, but that the title was impressed with a public trust); California v. Superior Court of 
Placer Cnty., 625 P.2d 256, 260 (Cal. 1981) (holding that boundaries between public and private 
ownership of riparian lands should be determined with reference to the lake’s current level); see also 
Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court of Alpine Cnty., 658 P.2d 709, 709 (Cal. 1983), cert. denied, 
464 U.S. 977 (1983) (applying public trust doctrine to water appropriation rights).
 271 See, e.g., Larman v. Iowa, 552 N.W.2d 158, 161 (Iowa 1996) (stating that the public trust 
doctrine embraces recreational purposes); State v. Longshore, 5 P.3d 1256, 1262–63 (Wash. 2000) 
(stating the public trust in Washington includes “incidental rights of fishing, boating, swimming, 
water skiing, and other related recreational purpose generally regarded as corollary to the right to 
navigation and use of public waters”); Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 998 So.2d 
1102, 1108 (Fla. 2008) (same).
 272 Gion v. Santa Cruz, 465 P.2d 50, 58–60 (Cal. 1970) (en banc) (finding strong public 
policy in favor of public access to the shoreline); Hixon v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 146 N.W.2d 577, 
582 (Wis. 1966) (discussing the public trust doctrine as historically including the right to hunt, 
swim, fish, and sail); Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 73–74 (Mich. 2005) (finding the public 
trust ensures the right to walk along the shores of the Great Lakes).
 273 See Dep’t of Natural Res. v. Mayor & Council of Ocean City, 332 A.2d 630, 638 (Md. 
1975) (finding that a prior grant of the foreshore to the owner of the littoral, limits the public’s right 
to navigation and fishing); Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 313 N.E. 2d 
561, 566–67 (Mass. 1974) (holding public trust doctrine does not include the right to walk on the 
beach or public bathing); Eaton v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 177 (Me. 1989) (finding that the 
public trust gives right of fishing, fowling, and navigation only).
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 In the context of shore lands, one state embraced a practical conception of 
the public trust doctrine. The New Jersey Supreme Court declared that not only 
does the public have the right to enjoy the seashore, notwithstanding abutting 
private land, but that those abutting landowners must give access over their land 
to get to the shore.274 In Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Association,275 a 
resident of Point Pleasant who desired to swim and bathe at the Bay Head beach 
sued an association of homeowners and individual homeowners to establish the 
right to cross privately owned land in order to gain access to the public beach. 
The court found the public trust doctrine imposed burdens, necessary to facilitate 
the enjoyment of natural resources in the public trust, upon private landowners. 
In the court’s view “the public trust doctrine does not prohibit all alienation by 
the state of riparian lands, but that conveyances are subject to use by the public 
depending on the nature of the land.”276 While the state has the unquestioned 
power to lease and grant the foreshore and ocean beach property consistent 
with the public interest,277 at the same time, the public may have a right to 
cross privately owned dry sand beaches in order to gain access to the foreshore.278 
That interest “may be of the sort enjoyed by the public in municipal beaches, 
namely, the right to sunbathe and generally enjoy recreational activities.”279 
The court pointed to what was uncontested, that beaches are a “unique” and 
“irreplaceable” resource.280 
 Without some means of access, the public right to use the foreshore would 
be meaningless. “To say that the public trust doctrine entitles the public to swim 
in the ocean and to use the foreshore in connection therewith without assuring 
the public a feasible access route would seriously impinge on, if not effectively 
eliminate, the rights associated with the public trust doctrine.”281 The right 
conferred is not an “unrestricted right to cross at will over all property bordering 
common property,” but ensures only “reasonable access to the sea.”282 Thus, 
“where use of dry sand is essential or reasonably necessary for enjoyment of the 
 274 Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 375–66 (N.J. 1984). 
 275 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984).
 276 Id. at 361–65 n.5 (citing N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth. v. McCrane, 292 A.2d 545 (N.J. 
1972)). 
 277 Id. at 362, n.5.
 278 Id. at 363.
 279 Id. at 364. 
 280 Id. 
 281 Id. 
 282 Id. 
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ocean, the doctrine warrants the public’s use of the upland dry sand area subject 
to an accommodation of the interests of the owner.”283 
 As an evolving concept, the public trust doctrine should be and is applied to 
reflect our evolving relationship with the natural environment. With respect to 
private lands abutting common property, it is properly subject to a right of use 
and enjoyment by the public. In effect, the private owner holds land, to a point, 
as trustee for the benefit of the public. 
 To be sure, certain interests—like the air and the sea—have such importance 
to the citizens of the country as a whole that they cannot be the subject of 
private ownership. In our early history water served as a means of commerce and 
communication between disparate parts of the country; rivers offered the paths 
for exploration, facilitated the fur trade, and enabled timber harvests by log floats. 
Where the dense forests made road construction difficult and very costly, the 
aesthetic and spiritual values inhering in mountainous areas and forests have, in 
modern times, taken on the same value in our national psyche. 
 The public lands, particularly those in the mountainous and wilderness areas 
of the West, have the same public values as lands touched by the sea.284 Wildlife, 
minerals, timber, and pastures for grazing are an important source of commerce. 
Public land serves as a natural habitat for many species of wildlife and vegetation; 
the rivers and streams flowing through public land have served as places for 
recreation, apart from their service of commerce and communication.
b. The Original Public Trust Burdens on Federal Lands
 While Matthews was in certain respects groundbreaking, its application to 
federal public land access may be hampered by two philosophical and theoretical 
impediments. First, despite the very clear federal land policy in favor of preservation 
and conservation, there is yet no general agreement on the need for protection 
of the public lands by the public trust doctrine. After all, throughout most of 
our history, the policy animating the federal government was one of disposal, 
not retention or conservation. Second, it is not well-settled whether or not the 
public trust doctrine binds the federal government in the same way as it burdens 
state governments.
 283 Id. at 365; see also Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 
54–55 (N.J. 1972) (finding the public trust doctrine forbids municipalities from discriminating 
between residents and nonresidents when charging user fees for the beach—access must be provided 
equally to all).
 284 For a discussion of the various public interests courts have recognized as implicating the 
public trust doctrine, see Richard J. Lazurus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in 
Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 ioWa L. Rev. 631 (1986).
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 Decades ago, one of our nation’s most avid environmentalists, Professor 
Joseph Sax, spoke about the overarching role of the public trust doctrine as it 
applied to natural resources.285 Under his conception, the larger philosophical and 
spiritual aims that traditionally define the public trust doctrine seem equally apt 
for public lands.
 Professor Sax’s conception found some support in Supreme Court pro-
nouncements made more than a century earlier. The earliest recognition that 
the government’s public land ownership might be impressed with a trust was 
established in United States v. Trinidad Coal & Coking Co.286 In that case, the 
Court stated the government’s vacant coal lands “were held in trust for all the 
people; and, in making regulations for disposing of them, [C]ongress . . . , in the 
discharge of a high public duty, and in the interest of the whole country, sought 
to develop the material resources of the United States . . . . ”287
 This position was reiterated in Light v. United States,288 where the Court 
upheld a trespass judgment against a cattle herder on public lands. The Court 
reminded us that:
All the public lands of the nation are held in trust for the people 
of the whole country . . . . And it is not for the courts to say 
how that trust shall be administered. That is for Congress to 
determine. The courts cannot compel it to set aside the lands 
for settlement; or to suffer them to be used for agricultural 
or grazing purposes; nor interfere when, in the exercise of its 
discretion, Congress establishes a forest reserve for what it 
decides to be national and public purposes. In the same way and 
in the exercise of the same trust it may disestablish a reserve, and 
devote the property to some other national and public purpose. 
 285 Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial 
Intervention, 68 mich. L. Rev. 471 (1969–1970). Professor Sax believed that “[o]f all the concepts 
known to American law, only the public trust doctrine seems to have the breadth and substantive 
content which might make it useful as a tool of general application for citizens seeking to develop 
a comprehensive legal approach to resource management problems.” Id. at 474. He explained the 
public trust doctrine rests upon the belief “that certain interests are so intrinsically important to 
every citizen that their free availability tends to mark the society as one of citizens rather than 
of serfs[;] . . . that to protect those rights, it is necessary to be especially wary lest any particular 
individual or group acquire the power to control them.” Id. at 484.
 286 137 U.S. 160 (1890).
 287 United States v. Trinidad Coal & Coking Co., 137 U.S. 160, 170 (1890); see also United 
States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 40 (1947) (“The government, which holds its interest here as 
elsewhere in trust for all the people, is not to be deprived of those interests by the ordinary court 
rules designed particularly for private disputes over individually owned pieces of property . . . . ”); 
Saulque v. United States, 663 F. 2d 968, 976 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding the government holds lands 
in trust for all people).
 288 220 U.S. 523 (1911).
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These are rights incident to proprietorship, to say nothing of 
the power of the United States as a sovereign over the property 
belonging to it.289
The limits to those powers as trustee seem to be that they be exercised for some 
“national or public purpose.”
 In United States v. Beebe, in an action to set aside and cancel certain land 
patents, the Supreme Court noted that the “public domain is held by the 
Government as part of its trust.”290 This means that “[t]he Government is charged 
with the duty, and clothed with the power, to protect it from trespass and unlawful 
appropriation . . . .”291
 The Court in Illinois Central discussed the public trust doctrine as it applied 
to limit a state’s disposition of a public trust resource. The burdens of the public 
trust, with respect to what the federal government can do with federal lands, is 
much less certain. The Court stated, although in dicta, that title to land under 
navigable waterways is “different from the title . . . the United States hold[s] in 
the public lands which are open to pre-emption and sale.”292 One could interpret 
this language to indicate that the public trust doctrine does not apply to inland 
public lands. Alternatively, one might interpret the public trust doctrine as being 
inapplicable to lands that Congress has not reserved or withdrawn. 
 Perhaps the best sense of the court’s conception of the extent of the public 
trust burdens on the federal government is found in Alabama v. Texas.293 The 
Court explained the nature of the public trust, stating: 
The United States holds [such] resources . . . in trust for its 
citizens in one sense, but not in the sense that a private trustee 
holds for a cestui que trust. The responsibility of Congress is to 
utilize the assets that come into its hands as sovereign in the way 
that it decides is best for the . . . Nation.294
 289 Id. at 537 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
 290 United States v. Beebe, 127 U.S. 338, 342 (1888).
 291 Id.
 292 Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892).
 293 347 U.S. 272 (1953). 
 294 Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 277 (1953) (emphasis added); see also United States v. 
California, 332 U.S. 19, 38–39 (1947) (finding jus publicum as to oil found in waters within three 
mile limit off shore).
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 The lower courts have been less than uniform in their interpretation of the 
public trust as it applies to the federal government.295 In the late 1970’s and 
early 1980’s, lower federal courts seemed susceptible to the idea of the public 
trust doctrine covering federal lands. During this period, the Sierra Club filed 
a series of suits against the Department of Interior seeking to establish that the 
Department had “trust” obligations apart from statutory directives, requiring 
it to take specific action to protect public lands. In Sierra Club v. Block,296 the 
District Court seemed squarely to recognize the public trust doctrine as applying 
to federal lands297 and the holding appeared to affirm the validity of the public 
trust doctrine as it applied to the federal government as a source of duties and as 
a restraint of sorts on its powers in dealing with federal lands. But that restraint 
and those duties were found to extend no further than the express limits or duties 
Congress has imposed in legislation dealing with federal lands. In this sense, the 
public trust doctrine is coterminous with applicable legislation. In Sierra Club v. 
Dep’t of the Interior,298 the parties had some initial success asserting the public trust 
doctrine, with the court noting: 
 295 United States v. Burlington Ne. R.R. Co., 710 F. Supp. 1286 (D. Neb. 1989) (finding 
public trust gave the United States standing to recover for injury to wildlife); United States v. 1.58 
Acres of Land in Boston, Suffolk, Mass., 523 F. Supp. 120, 125 (D. Mass. 1981) (holding that 
“federal government is as restricted as the state in its ability to abdicate to private individuals its 
sovereign rights in the land”); In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980) (finding 
Virginia and federal government could recover under the public trust doctrine from property owner 
for the killing of water fowl); District of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1084 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984) (declining to expressly state whether or not the public trust doctrine applied to tidal 
waters and the land submerged beneath them, even though the concept of the federal government 
holding public lands in trust for the public was longstanding). But see Alaska Constitutional Legal 
Def. Conservation Fund, Inc. v. Kempthorne, 198 F. App’x 601, 603 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 
549549 U.S. 1181 (2007) (“Public Trust Doctrine is currently applicable only to states. Because 
[plaintiffs] provide no support for extending this doctrine to the federal government, the district 
court properly dismissed this claim.”); United States v. 11.037 Acres of Land, 685 F. Supp. 214, 
217 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (finding public trust does not survive federal condemnation of trust land). 
While one suit was met with a rather sympathetic ear, in the end, all courts who addressed the issue 
rejected the idea that there are undefined, fluid obligations directing the government to manage the 
public lands toward any particular ends. Indeed, all the courts recognized that while the Secretary 
of Interior is charged with managing the public lands toward the general ends stated in the statutes, 
how the Secretary carries out those directives is left largely within the discretion of the Secretary. 
Sierra Club v. Watt, 659 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Sierra Club v. Andrus, 487 F. Supp. 443 
(D.D.C. 1980); Sierra Club v. Block, 622 F. Supp. 842 (D. Colo. 1985). In all three cases, the Sierra 
Club sought to have the Department of the Interior take specific action not expressly required by 
statute, that is, to assert federal water rights as this would safeguard and protect the public lands. 
At the same time, at least one court recognized that that discretion is not unlimited. Andrus, 487 
F. Supp. at 448–49.
 296 622 F. Supp. 842 (D. Colo. 1985).
 297 Block, 622 F. Supp. at 846.
 298 398 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
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[T]here is . . . a general trust duty imposed upon the National  
Park Service, Department of Interior, by the National Park 
System, 16 U.S.C. § 1 et. seq., to conserve scenery and natural 
and historic objects and wildlife [in the National Parks, Monu-
ments, and reservations] and to provide for the enjoyment of 
the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them 
unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.299
However, when the case returned to the court after the district court ordered the 
government to come up with a plan for the management and protection of the 
redwoods, the court found that the only duties applicable to the Department were 
those found in the statutes.300
 Even if the management directives found in the various statutes could be read 
to preclude the government from engaging in certain activities likely to violate 
those directives, it would be a huge leap to read them to require the government 
to take any particular act in managing public resources.
c. The Public Trust Doctrine Servitude
 Even if courts were more susceptible to a generalized trust concept that 
burdened the federal government’s management of public lands, would that trust 
necessarily mean that the public must be afforded access? Or, is it fulfilled by 
the government’s acts toward protection and preservation? If these public lands 
had been covered by the public trust, it would mean that the government was 
incapable of alienating a part of the land that did not bear the burdens of that 
trust. This would mean that a public right to continue using the conveyed away 
parcel would persist for the purposes of the trust. 
 It seems without dispute that the public trust would impose upon the 
government an “affirmative obligation” to protect resources. This is generally said 
to mean that government must act as a fiduciary to manage the resources covered 
by the doctrine in a way that safeguards them from avoidable dissipation. Yet, two 
fundamental issues need to be addressed. The first is whether this duty to protect 
and preserve means a duty to facilitate the enjoyment of the resources covered. 
It would seem so, since enjoyment of the resources really is the reason for the 
trust to start with. The second is whether it is fair to look back now, to apply the 
evolved concept of public trust to an interest acquired centuries ago. Considering 
the importance of the public lands and that the abutting private land serves as 
 299 Sierra Club v. Dep’t of the Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284, 287 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (alteration in 
original) (citation omitted). See also Sierra Club v. Dep’t of the Interior, 424 F. Supp. 172 (N.D. Cal. 
1976); Sierra Club v. Dep’t of the Interior, 376 F. Supp. 90 (N.D. Cal. 1974). Sierra Club v. Dep’t 
of the Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
 300 Sierra Club v. Dep’t of the Interior, 424 F. Supp. at 175.
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the gateway to this important public resource, it would not be unfair to find that 
the private owner should reasonably have been expected to accommodate the 
public by allowing access. In Leo Sheep, the Supreme Court discussed the history 
of the land disposal policy that largely resulted in the blocked access and found 
that at the time, the access problems were known, and Congress anticipated that 
neighbors would act neighborly to work them out.301 This comment suggests 
some anticipation or at least the wisdom of anticipation by the parties of new 
rights and consequently new burdens to undertake.
 More than anything, property is about expectations—of continued control, 
exclusive possession, and return on investment. Relationships and acquisitions 
are created and founded upon prevailing rules and conventions in the community 
and these could be entirely frustrated if new, exogenous rules were to be imposed. 
There is a great societal interest in leaving undisturbed settled rules as to what 
is or is not property in order to create reliance. Reliance encourages investment 
for productivity: if we want farmers to plant crops in the spring, they must have 
some assurance that they will be free to harvest that crop for their benefit in the 
fall.302 If we want farmers to maintain an efficient and well-maintained farm, they 
must be assured that they will be able to continue farming. Security in property 
ownership leads to more stable and well-governed communities. Landowners 
take a greater interest in the well-being of their communities. Property rules, 
then, create expectations among the holders of property. But those expectations 
are bounded by what a state chooses to recognize as entitled to protection. This 
means that certain private expectations or desires of property owners may not 
be supported by the state and, therefore, are not recognized as property if they 
fail to serve larger interests determined by the community to be desirable. As 
stated earlier, any reliance must embrace the inevitability of evolving notions 
of property in the common law. The prevailing conception is that property is a 
social instrument: it exists to serve human needs.303 This means that while there 
are some bedrock principles that protect property, those same principles are not 
etched in that bedrock. Instead, as human needs change so do property rights. 
Communities created property and communities can curtail it.304
 301 See Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 672–73, 676–77 (1979).
 302 See Richard A. Epstein, How to Create—or Destroy—Wealth in Real Property, 58 aLa. L. 
Rev. 741, 748 (2007).
 303 State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372 (N.J. 1971).
 304 In recent times, states have altered the nature of many interests in real property by 
legislation and by judge-made rule. For example, a possibility of reverter created when a fee simple 
determinable is conveyed may not last forever, as was the conception at common law. Instead, by 
statute in a number of states, they terminate if the event that will cause the estate to revert does not 
occur within thirty years of creation unless the holder of the interest records notice of the existence 
of the interest. See, e.g., mcKinney’S ReaL pRopeRty LaW, mcKinney’S conSoLidated LaWS oF neW 
yoRK annotated § 345 (2013); caL civ. code § 885.030 (West 2013). In other states covenants 
cannot be created to last forever, but terminate after thirty years unless renewed by the interested 
parties, and then they are only enforced by damages and not an injunction. See, e.g., maSS. gen. 
LaWS. ch. 184, § 27, 30 (West 2013).
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 305 david hume, a tReatiSe oF human natuRe, reprinted from the original edition in three 
volumes and edited (L.A. Selbybiggie ed., Oxford, Clarendon Press 1965) (1739). 
 306 Id. at 490.
 307 Id.
 308 1 the neW paLgRave dictionaRy oF economieS and the LaW 454 (Peter Newman 
ed., 1998). 
 309 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995) (upholding 
regulations defining habitat destruction as a taking within the meaning of the endangered species 
act); N.J. Shore Builders Ass’n v. Jackson, 970 A.2d 992 (N.J. 2009) (upholding ordinance requiring 
replacing a tree for each one in connection with development of lots). 
 310 Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 273 (1954); United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 
29–30 (1940); Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 539 (1911).
 311 Indeed, until 1976, the prevailing federal policy was to dispose of federal land by sales or 
grants to states, corporations, railroads, and individuals. For a further discussion of the history of 
the governments public land policies, see supra Part V.
 David Hume, in his Treatise of Human Nature,305 described property rights as 
“conventions”306 that arise spontaneously from: 
[A] general sense of common interest; which sense all the 
members of the society express to one another, and which 
induces them to regulate their conduct by certain rules . . . .  
[T]he actions of each of us have a reference to those of the other, 
and are perform[ed] upon the supposition, that something is to 
be perform[ed] on the other part.307 
A convention is generally a shared understanding or implicit agreement adhered 
to because of a general expectation that others will follow.308 Conventions arise in 
response to a felt need, then, as routinely practiced, take on the force of law. They 
guide behavior and set the contours of rights and obligations. 
 It is doubtful that any notion of property rights as inviolate has ever risen to 
the level of a convention. Nuisance laws seemed to have always been a part of the 
fabric of the common law. So too was a neighbor’s right to subjacent support and 
limits on a riparian owner’s water uses. In the modern era, limits on land use are 
pervasive. Regulations not only determine what structures can be placed on land, 
but also prohibit what can be removed.309 These effects and benefits of regulations 
radiate outwardly toward the public at large. 
vii. concLuSion
 What are the government’s obligations as trustee? The Supreme Court has 
expressed its reluctance to second-guess Congress as to how it administers the 
trust.310 Does the Property Clause give Congress unreviewable powers to deal 
with the public lands in any way it sees fit? Could Congress decide to give away 
all the public lands without judicial scrutiny?311 Surely, if it decided to give away 
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 312 See generally Sierra Club v. Dep’t of the Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284, 287 (N.D. Cal. 1975) 
(discussing a statute expressly authorizing the Secretary to take certain steps protecting a national 
park from damage). 
 313 Sax, supra note 285, at 494–95.
 314 Sax, supra note 285, at 542–43; see also United States v. Jenks, 129 F.3d 1348 (10th 
Cir. 1997) (recognizing government’s power to regulate access by inholders over public land, but 
cautioning that “imposition of onerous requirements on inholders seeking access rights which 
are unrelated or disproportionate to any expected public benefit [may] constitute arbitrary and 
capricious conduct in violation of law”). 
 315 Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
 316 Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537 (1911) (“[I]t is not for the courts to say how that 
trust shall be administered. That is for Congress to determine . . . . [Rights to set up or withdraw 
reserves] are rights incident to proprietorship, to say nothing of the power of the United States as a 
sovereign over the property belonging to it.”).
 317 See generally 43 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). Title 43, Section 2 of the United States Code, assigning 
duties to the Secretary of the Interior, reflects this attitude. The Secretary was to: “perform all 
executive duties appertaining to the surveying and sale of the public lands of the United States, 
or in anywise respecting such public lands, and, also such as relate to private claims of land, and 
the issuing of patents for all grants of land under the authority of the Government.” 43 U.S.C. 
§ 2 (1988). 
 318 “He who hath not cannot give.”
lands only to Irish descendants, that would be challengeable on equal protection 
grounds. Or can it be argued that there is some implied limitation that only 
those actions that serve some public or national interest will be upheld (although 
the Court would give great deference to Congress’ determination of the public 
interest)? Nonetheless, courts should have the power to review agency decisions to 
determine compliance with statutory mandates and duties of a trustee as Congress 
has incorporated them in particular statutes.312 More than three decades ago, 
Professor Sax developed a theory of “limited review” in the context of the public 
trust.313 He stated that courts should overturn an agency action that breaches the 
trust unless the legislature has enacted a statute expressly authorizing the action.314 
 As stated, under the Property Clause of the Constitution, Congress’ power 
over public lands is plenary and includes the power of a sovereign as well as 
a proprietor.315 Even if it is said that Congress holds public lands in trust for 
the citizenry, how Congress manages that trust generally is left to Congress.316 
Even though in our early history, the policy of the federal government has been 
to alienate lands,317 in recent times, Congress, or the administrative agency in 
charge, has often reserved lands for special purposes (such as national forests, 
wildlife refuges, and national monuments) or withdrew lands from the operation 
of the disposition laws altogether. Through these recent actions, Congress has 
acknowledged that special public values inhere in the natural world residing 
within public lands. The specific language in various forms of legislation confirms 
this. A public trust both animates and limits the government’s, and hence its 
transferee’s, powers as owner. Nemo dat qui non habet.318
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